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Abstract
This article argues for a constitutional right to counsel for state inmates
in all initial federal habeas corpus proceedings based on access-to-thecourts doctrine. The doctrine guarantees an indigent inmate a constitutional
right to meaningful access to the courts in incarceration-related litigation,
including postconviction proceedings.
The Supreme Court initially
articulated the access right, in relevant part, as merely prohibiting states
from actively interfering with an indigent inmate’s efforts at pursuing
postconviction relief from a criminal judgment. Today, though still fairly
inscrutable in dimension, the access right has evolved to require states in
certain circumstances to provide affirmative assistance to inmates to ensure
constitutionally adequate access to the writ.
In Pennsylvania v. Finley1 and Murray v. Giarratano,2 a pair of
decisions rendered in 1987 and 1989, respectively, the Supreme Court held
that the right of access does not require assistance of counsel in either
noncapital or capital state postconviction proceedings, at least insofar as the
inmate seeks to raise claims litigated on direct appeal. The primary
rationale in Finley and Murray was that habeas litigants have enjoyed
assistance of counsel at trial and on direct appeal, and thus should be able
1
2

481 U.S. 551, 559 (1987).
492 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1989).

simply to parrot that work product in the federal habeas forum to obtain
judicial review of any cognizable claims. The Court analogized to an
earlier case, Ross v. Moffitt,3 in which it had held no right to counsel
attaches in discretionary appeals. The Court has never addressed the issue
whether the access right demands assistance of counsel in federal habeas
proceedings. But the lack of such right appeared a foregone conclusion
after Finley and Giarratano.
On April 24, 1996, however, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), which introduced a
myriad of exceedingly complex procedural requirements -- most
significantly, a one-year statute of limitations -- that a petitioner must
satisfy in order to obtain merits review of claims set forth in a federal
habeas petition. For the prototypical pro se habeas litigant, these
requirements, in particular the statute of limitations, erected an impenetrable
wall around federal judicial review of merits claims. Indeed, the effect of
AEDPA’s enactment has been to stymie many pro se inmates’ efforts at
obtaining federal habeas review of state court judgments. Yet, to date, the
Supreme Court has not recognized a right to counsel in federal habeas
corpus. Federal courts, while struggling mightily to make sense of a poorly
drafted statute, continue to abide by a literal fiction in assuming that most
inmates are sufficiently competent to navigate post-AEDPA federal habeas
practice without assistance of counsel.
This article argues that absent constitutionally guaranteed assistance of
counsel in federal habeas corpus and a concomitant remedy where that
assistance falls short, AEDPA’s procedural intricacies function to deny the
indigent, pro se state inmate the right to meaningful access to the courts in
federal habeas proceedings. As such, absent repeal of AEDPA, the access
right requires recognition of a right to assistance of counsel in filing a first
federal petition. This right would extend only to navigating and
comprehending the procedural complexity of federal habeas under AEDPA,
rather than to the articulation and framing of substantive claims and
subsequent litigation.
INTRODUCTION
The impetus for this article derives from my work as a staff attorney
with the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, where I was responsible for
reviewing requests for certificates of appealability, which are required by
statute in order to appeal district court denials of federal habeas petitions,
and making recommendations to motions panels regarding whether the
certificates should issue. This work required my review of federal petitions
and the district court rulings. In the more than four years I spent at the
court, I reviewed and presented to motions panels over eight hundred
petitions. Virtually all of these petitions were prepared pro se, often
handwritten on court-issued forms or typed out on old typewriters. As a
3

417 U.S. 600 (1974).
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lawyer with substantial experience in the federal criminal justice system,4
by far the most challenging issues for me to unpack were procedural in
nature. Difficulties frequently emerged from the thin language of AEDPA
and the number of unresolved questions that have resulted. Typically, once
– or rather, if – the litigant cleared the procedural hurdles, the appropriate
disposition of the merits of a particular petition became readily apparent.

4
Prior to working at the Ninth Circuit, I spent a year clerking on that court, two years as an AttorneyAdvisor at the Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Department of Justice, where I provided legal advice to the
Executive Branch primarily on criminal procedure issues, and five years as a trial and appellate lawyer with the
Federal Public Defender’s Office in Los Angeles.

5

Emily Garcia Uhrig

Throughout this work, I never ceased to be astonished by the legal
expectation, grounded in the absence of a recognized right to counsel in
federal habeas corpus proceedings, that inmates navigate AEDPA’s
complexity successfully in order to obtain judicial review of the merits of
their claims. In the trial context, the Supreme Court has recognized that
“[w]hile a criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected
to enter the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of
unarmed prisoners to gladiators.”5 What I witnessed in federal habeas
practice for noncapital, pro se litigants is precisely such a slaughter.
Indeed, statistics bear out my experience. A recent study conducted by
Vanderbilt Law School found that over ninety percent of non-capital habeas
cases involve pro se litigants. Moreover, district courts dismiss as untimely
more than one in five non-capital cases, the vast majority of which are
uncounseled. In practice, without assistance of counsel, AEDPA has
shrouded the Great Writ in an impenetrable fog, leaving merits review of
claims that a state inmate raises in a federal petition to little more than the
fortuity of access to a competent jailhouse lawyer.
The instant article argues that AEDPA’s procedural intricacies, coupled
with a lack of a constitutional right to assistance of counsel, function to
deny the indigent, pro se state inmate the right to meaningful access to the
courts in pursuit of the Great Writ. As such, absent repeal of AEDPA, the
access right should require recognition of a right to assistance of counsel for
state inmates in filing a first federal petition. Because a right to counsel
requires effective assistance of counsel, petitioners would have a meaningful
remedy should counsel be unavailable or render ineffective assistance in
apprehending the procedural strictures of the AEDPA. In this way, we can
begin to clear a path through AEDPA’s procedural thicket for the indigent
habeas petitioner and ensure the constitutional guarantee of meaningful
access to judicial review.
In practical consequence, the proposal is a radical one. States have
fallen far short in realizing Gideon v. Wainright’s6 decades-old promise of a
right to counsel at trial.7 Thus, to imagine a right to counsel in federal
habeas may seem both decadent and unrealistic. But it is precisely because
Gideon’s dream has not fully materialized that habeas corpus occupies such
a crucial role in our criminal justice system. Without an effective,
accessible habeas writ, inmates who suffer at the hands of incompetent trial
or appellate counsel are at best, lost to the system; at worst, they lose their
lives. Beyond the personal cost to those directly affected, we, as a society,
are left with the stain of that injustice.
5
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 657 (1984) (internal quotation omitted) (reversing Tenth Circuit’s
presumption of ineffectiveness where young and inexperienced trial counsel had only 25 days to prepare complex,
serious case and some witnesses were not easily accessible).
6
372 U.S. 335 (1963).
7
See Bruce R. Jacob, Memories of and Reflections About Gideon v. Wainwright, 33 STETSON L. REV. 181,
282 (2003); Christopher N. Lasch, The Future of Teague Retroactivity, or “Redressability,” After Danforth v.
Minnesota: Why Lower Courts Should Give Retroactive Effect to New Constitutional Rules of Criminal Procedure
in Postconviction Proceedings, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (2009).

“MEANINGFUL ACCESS” AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
This Article is structured as follows: Part I identifies the problem, i.e.,
the lack of a constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas corpus and the
near impenetrability of post-AEDPA federal habeas practice for pro se
litigants. Part II sets forth the access-to-the-courts doctrine as a framework
for recognition of a constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas. Part III
applies the access doctrine to AEDPA, arguing that the right to meaningful
access demands assistance of counsel in navigating AEDPA’s procedural
thicket. Lastly, Part IV explores different models for implementation of an
access-based right to counsel in federal habeas corpus.
I. THE PROBLEM: THE IMPOSSIBLE TASK OF NAVIGATING AEDPA’S
PROCEDURAL MORASS WITHOUT ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL
A. The Lack of a Recognized Constitutional Right to Counsel in Federal
Habeas Proceedings.
To date, the Supreme Court has only recognized a constitutional right to
counsel for the criminally accused at trial8 and on the first direct appeal of
right.9 This right extends to all felony defendants as well as misdemeanor
defendants who face a potential loss of life or liberty.10 Moreover, the right
to counsel at trial extends to all “‘critical’ stages of the proceedings” against
the defendant, and not merely to the trial itself.11 But the Court has
declined to recognize a constitutional right to counsel in seeking
discretionary review before a state’s Supreme Court or in filing a petition
for writ of certiorari before the U.S. Supreme Court.12
Thus far, the Supreme Court has also declined to recognize a
constitutional right to counsel in state postconviction proceedings, at least
insofar as the petitioner seeks to raise claims previously litigated at trial or
on appeal.13 As I will discuss in greater depth in Part II, infra, in
Pennsylvania v. Finley, decided in 1987, the Court rejected a claim that the
constitutional right to meaningful access to the courts requires assistance of
8
See Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (recognizing Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment right to counsel
for capital defendants); Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (recognizing Sixth Amendment right to counsel
for federal criminal defendants facing loss of life or liberty); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (extending
Powell to noncapital criminal defendants).
9
See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356-68 (1963) (recognizing due process and equal protection
right to counsel on first appeal).
10
See Jacob, supra note 6; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979) (finding that whether an indigent
defendant has the right to appointment of counsel under Gideon depends on the ultimate sanction imposed);
Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 743 n.9 (1994) (noting in dicta that, for felony cases, the right to counsel
does not depend on potential incarceration); Alabama v. Shelton, 535 U.S. 654, 654 (2002) (recognizing right to
counsel in misdemeanor cases even where sentencing court suspends a prison or jail sentence and imposes
probation).
11
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25 (1967) (concluding that post-indictment lineup is critical
stage of prosecution and thus, right to counsel attaches). See also United States v. Gouveia, 467 U.S. 180, 192-93
(1984) (holding right to counsel attaches at preliminary hearing and arraignment only if certain rights are at risk
but unconditionally at sentencing).
12
Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 601-02 (1974) (concluding due process and equal protection interests
underlying right to counsel on direct appeal do not extend to discretionary review by state’s high court).
13
See Emily Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS
L.J. 541 (2009) (arguing for a right to counsel in habeas corpus for claims unique to habeas proceedings, for
which the petitioner has not yet had assistance of counsel).
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counsel in state, non-capital habeas proceedings.14 Rather, the Court held
that a pro se inmate’s access to the trial record and the appellate briefs and
opinions suffice to provide meaningful access to the courts for
postconviction litigation.15 Thus, as with discretionary appeals, no
constitutional right to counsel attaches during state postconviction
proceedings.16
Two years later, in Murray v. Giarratano, a plurality of the Court
affirmed Finley and held, in relevant part, that the constitutional guarantee
of meaningful access to the courts also does not require assistance of
counsel during state postconviction proceedings involving capital
defendants.17 Specifically, in Murray, Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices
White, O’Connor, and Scalia, rejected the argument by Virginia death row
inmates that assistance of counsel was necessary in order to ensure their
constitutional right of access to the courts in state habeas proceedings, as
guaranteed by Bounds v. Smith.18 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice
O’Connor, concurred in the judgment, but noted that “[t]he complexity of
[Supreme Court] jurisprudence in this area . . . makes it unlikely that capital
defendants will be able to file successful petitions for collateral relief
without the assistance of persons learned in the law.”19 Nonetheless, he
agreed petitioners had failed to state a claim for relief because, to date, no
capital petitioner in Virginia had been unable to obtain counsel to assist in
habeas proceedings and state prisons had staff attorneys to assist inmates
with preparing their petitions.20
Seven years later, in Lewis v. Casey, the Court modified its holding in
Bounds to make clear that the access right does not encompass assistance
with investigating claims and litigating them effectively.21 Rather, the right
encompasses only assistance in getting through the courthouse doors, as
opposed to a right to substantive assistance with one’s case.22 The Court
further held that to show an access violation, a petitioner must demonstrate
actual injury, i.e., that the state’s failure to provide adequate assistance
impeded the petitioner in his efforts to pursue a legal claim in
postconviction proceedings.23
The Court has not addressed whether a right to counsel attaches in
federal habeas proceedings. But federal courts since Finley, Giarratano,
and Lewis generally have assumed that both capital and noncapital inmates
14

Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555-557, 559 (1987) (rejecting right to counsel in state
postconviction proceedings on both access-to-the-courts and due process, fundamental fairness grounds).
15
Id. at 557.
16
Id.
17
Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11-13 (1989).
18
Id. at 3-4, 12; Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977) (“[T]he fundamental constitutional right of
access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal
papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the
law.”).
19
Murray, 492 U.S. at 14 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
20
Id.
21
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 354 (1996).
22
Id.
23
Id. at 351.
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do not have a constitutional right to counsel in federal habeas corpus
proceedings.24 This judicial mindset has remained intact despite the
dramatic overhaul and inordinate complication of federal habeas practice
wrought by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. The
complexity of post-AEDPA federal habeas practice calls for re-examination
of the issue and recognition of a limited right to counsel to ensure the
indigent state inmate’s constitutional right of access to the courts in federal
habeas proceedings.
B. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
On April 24, 1996, Congress enacted the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), which substantially narrowed the legal
parameters of federal habeas review.25 Conservative advocates had been
attempting to place limits on capital habeas corpus for decades.26 Critics
identified habeas practice, rather than the many flaws and irregularities that
often accompany capital prosecutions, as the source of unacceptable delay
between conviction and execution.27 Efforts at restricting the Great Writ
eventually found traction with the domestic terrorist bombing of the
Oklahoma City Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building, in which 168 people
perished. The emotional aftermath of the bombing, and a concomitant
desire to see “swift justice” imposed on the perpetrators, aligned with
Republican majorities in Congress to provide the necessary catalyst for
statutory change.28
In relevant part,29 AEDPA revised 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244 and 2253-2255,
which govern all federal habeas corpus proceedings.30 AEDPA also created
a new Chapter 154 of the Judicial Code for state capital cases that provides
for rules favorable to the state if the state meets certain conditions,
including providing assistance of counsel in the state postconviction
proceedings.31 The Conference Committee report summarized AEDPA’s
24
See, e.g., United States v. Pollard, 389 F.3d 101, 111 (4th Cir. 2004); United States v. Perez-Macias, 335
F.3d 421, 428 (5th Cir. 2003).
25
Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996).
26
See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S4363, 4365 (“Reform of our habeas corpus system has been needed, and
needed badly, for several decades now.”) (Sen. Abraham) (April 29, 1996).
27
See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. H3599, 3604 (April 18, 1996) (Sen. Hyde) (“Somehow, somewhere we are
going to end the charade of endless habeas proceedings, and this bill is going to do it.”); 142 Cong. Rec. S3454,
3459 (April 17, 1996) (Sen. Hatch) (“But just look at the highlights of this antiterrorism bill. Capital punishment
reform, death penalty reform, something that has been needed for years, decades. It is being abused all over the
country. There are better than 3,000 people who have been living on death row for years with the sentences never
carried out. . . .”).
28
See, e.g., 142 Cong. Rec. S4363 (April 29, 1996) (Sen. Abraham) (“The Oklahoma City bombing finally
provided the clarion call that made it possible for the Republican majority, with President Clinton’s reluctant
acquiescence, and over stiff resistance by a majority of the Democrats, to enact reforms to this legal quagmire.”).
29
Title I of AEDPA revised the federal habeas statutes; the remaining titles are unrelated. See Lindh v.
Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 326-27 n.1 (1997) (noting the other titles address victim restitution, international
terrorism, weapons and explosives restrictions, and “miscellaneous items,” respectively).
30
Lindh, 521 U.S. at 326-27.
31
Lindh, 521 U.S. at 327 (citing chapter 154, 110 Stat. 1221-1226), amended by the USA Patriot
Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (March 9, 2006). To date, no state
has been able to satisfy these heightened requirements, which include provision of competent counsel. See I
James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, I Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 3.3[a] at 147-152 (6th ed.
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purpose in revising federal habeas practice as follows: “This title
incorporates reforms to curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas
corpus, and to address the acute problems of unnecessary delay and abuse in
capital cases.”32 Similarly, President Clinton’s signing statement to
AEDPA declared the statute’s intent as being to “streamline Federal appeals
for convicted criminals sentenced to the death penalty,” though not to alter
substantively the standards for issuance of the writ.33
Despite its stated target of capital cases, AEDPA, as enacted,
fundamentally changed longstanding provisions governing all federal
habeas corpus practice.34 Most significantly, the statute introduced a oneyear statute of limitations to filing any federal habeas petition, introduced a
ban on filing second or successive petitions, and limited the scope of
substantive review. At the same time, AEDPA left intact the pre-existing
doctrines of exhaustion and procedural default. Federal courts have devoted
substantial energy since 1996 attempting to understand the intricate
mechanics of the statute of limitations as applied, as well as its interplay
with the remaining procedural doctrines. The resulting doctrine is
inordinately complex and vexing to even the most experienced of jurists.
This article does not attempt a thorough exposition of these procedural
doctrines.35 Rather, what follows is merely a general overview of the
doctrines that function, at times in concert, to block access to the courts for
the pro se habeas litigant.
C. Expecting the Impossible: The Introduction of a One-Year Statute of
Limitations
Until 1996, there was no fixed time limit for filing a federal habeas
petition challenging a state conviction. The only constraint was a flexible
rule of “prejudicial delay,” which resembled in effect the equitable doctrine
of laches.36 AEDPA introduced a one-year statute of limitations for filing §
2254 petitions challenging a state criminal judgment37 and § 2255 motions
2011). Hence, this article does not address the implications of those provisions.
32
H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). See also I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz,
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 3.2 at 112 (5th ed. 2005).
33
Statement of the President of the United States upon Signing the Antiterrorism Bill (available in LEXIS
Public Papers of the Presidents, 32 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 719 (White House, Apr. 24, 1996).
34
See Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005) (“The enactment of AEDPA in 1996 dramatically altered
the landscape for federal habeas petitions.”).
35
For the authoritative treatise on the nuances, intricacies, and history of federal habeas corpus, see I & II
James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice And Procedure (6th ed. 2011).
36
See I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2 at 249 (6th
ed. 2011).
37
Under AEDPA, for state inmates who seek federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, section 2244(d)
of that title now provides:
(1)

A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a
person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run
from the latest of –

(A)

the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the
expiration of the time for seeking such review;

“MEANINGFUL ACCESS” AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
attacking a federal criminal judgment.38 To understand the dramatic impact
of AEDPA’s statute of limitations requires an examination of its complex
mechanics.
Under §§ 2244(d) and 2255, the one-year statute of limitations does not
start to run until the challenged state or federal judgment becomes final, any
state-created impediments to filing are removed, and the factual or legal
bases for a claim become available.39 For state inmates, the time during
which state habeas proceedings pertinent to the judgment the inmate seeks
to challenge in federal court are pending tolls the one-year statute of
limitations. In light of these myriad triggering and tolling dates, calculation
of the statute of limitations, particularly under section 2244(d), has proven
extremely challenging. Indeed, at virtually every analytical juncture,
difficult issues have emerged.
Successfully navigating these hurdles
requires both legal skill and, where judicial precedent is lacking, the ability
to anticipate accurately AEDPA’s contours. Absent the fortuity of an
available and competent “jailhouse lawyer” -- i.e., a fellow inmate selfeducated in the legal process who assists other inmates in litigating claims
and cases40 -- pro se state habeas petitioners are stymied first by the lack of
sufficient legal skills to calculate the filing requirements. Second, even
where some assistance is provided, legal missteps are not uncommon by
even highly competent counsel. But absent a right to counsel in the first
(B)

the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in
violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was
prevented from filing by such State action;

(C)

the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme
Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D)

the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been
discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review
with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation
under this subsection.
38
For federal inmates seeking habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the revised statute provides:
(f) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to a motion under this section. The limitation period shall
run from the latest of –
(1)

the date on which the judgment of conviction becomes final;

(2)

the date on which the impediment to making a motion created by governmental action in violation of
the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the movant was prevented from making a
motion by such governmental action;

(3)

the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has
been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral
review; or

(4)

the date on which the facts supporting the claim or claims presented could have been discovered
through the exercise of due diligence.
28 U.S.C. § 2244(1)(B)-(D).
40
See Evan R. Seamone, Fahrenheit 451 on Cell Block D: A Bar Examination to Safeguard America's
Jailhouse Lawyers from the Post-Lewis Blaze Consuming their Law Libraries, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 91
(2006).
39
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instance, the petitioner is left without a remedy to correct any mistake,
including those that function to slam the courthouse door shut on
substantive merits review of federal habeas claims.
1. The Challenge Of Figuring Out Even Where To Begin: Calculating The
Elusive Triggering Date For The Statute Of Limitations.
The statute of limitations does not start to run until the judgment an
inmate seeks to challenge “becomes final.”41 But what does this mean?
That is, how does an inmate translate these two words into practice in his
own case? As with many of the most difficult issues posed under AEDPA,
the statute itself is silent on the issue. 42
As an initial matter, the inmate must determine whether to look to state
or federal law in assessing finality. Federal appellate courts disagree to
some extent as to the role of state law in defining “finality” under §
2244(d)(1)(A).43 Thus, the burden will be on the petitioner to determine
whether his jurisdiction honors state law in assessing finality. As with all
of AEDPA’s statute of limitations intricacies, an error in calculation can
doom a federal petition to dismissal as untimely.
But federal courts have generally agreed on several triggering
principles. First, when the petitioner pursues all available direct appeals
within the state or federal system, including discretionary appeals, the
triggering event is either the completion of certiorari proceedings in the
U.S. Supreme Court or the expiration of time within which to file a petition
for writ of certiorari.44 Second, if no direct appeal is filed, the conviction
becomes final at the expiration of the time for filing such appeal.45 The
same rule obtains where a petitioner files an untimely notice of appeal.46
Thus, if state law permits a defendant thirty days to file a notice of appeal of
a conviction by trial or guilty plea, but instead he or she waits a year to do
so, AEDPA’s statute of limitations will start to run after thirty days. As a
result, only one month will remain to file a federal habeas petition by the
41

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
The Supreme Court has noted finality under § 2244(d) “is a concept that has been ‘variously defined . . .
[and] like many legal terms, its precise meaning depends on context.’” Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S.Ct. 681,
685 (2009).
43
Compare Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 693-95 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing to consider state law that set
date of finality of judgment with court of appeals’ issuance of mandate), and Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.3d
894, 897-98 & n.4 (9th Cir. 2001) (despite state courts’ use of date of issuance of mandate as point of finality of
judgment, finding conviction became “final” under § 2244(d)(1)(A) when state appellate court denied motion to
modify ruling), with Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331, 1333 (11th Cir. 2001) (finding judgment becomes final on
date of issuance of mandate, as provided by Florida state law).
44
See, e.g., Jimenez v. Quarterman, 129 S. Ct. at 685; Clay v. United States, 537 U.S. 522, 524-25, 527
(2003); Robinson v. United States, 416 F.3d 645, 647 (7th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1176 (2006); Nix v.
Secretary, Dep’t of Corr., 393 F.3d 1235, 1236-37 (11th Cir. 2004) (per curiam), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1114
(2005); see also I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b] at
269-271 & n. 485 (6th ed. 2011).
45
See United States v. Plascencia, 537 F.3d 385, 388 (5th Cir. 2008); Moshier v. United States, 402 F.3d
116, 118 (2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam); Sanchez-Castellano v. United States, 358 F.3d 424, 428 (6th Cir. 2004);
Kapral v. United States, 166 F.3d 565, 575 (3d Cir. 1999); see also I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal
Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b][i] at 272 & n. 48 (6th ed. 2011).
46
See Randle v. Crawford, 578 F.3d 1177, 1183-1184 (9th Cir. 2009); Bethea v. Girdich, 293 F.3d 577, 578
-79 (2d Cir. 2002).
42

“MEANINGFUL ACCESS” AND THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL
time the state notice of appeal is filed. Similarly, where a petitioner files a
first direct appeal to the state intermediate appellate court but does not
pursue a direct appeal as of right to a higher state court, the triggering event
becomes the date of expiration for filing the appeal to the higher appellate
court.47 The result is that AEDPA’s trigger date, i.e., when the sand begins
to slip through the proverbial hour glass for federal habeas review, is a
moving target, dependent on what relief a petitioner seeks, or fails to seek,
on direct review. Yet the calculation is critical for it is obvious that only in
knowing when the one-year statute of limitations starts to run can a
petitioner have a chance at determining when it ends.
2. Impediments To Filing: Once The Clock Has Started To Tick, What, If
Anything, Will Cause It To Stop?
Regardless of when a conviction becomes final, thus triggering the start
of the one-year period of time to file a federal petition, the statute of
limitations will not run under § 2244(d) during any period in which a state
or government-created “impediment” prevents the petitioner from filing the
petition or motion.48 Such impediments can exist prior to the conviction
becoming final, thus forestalling the start of the statute of limitations. Or an
impediment can arise once the statute of limitations has already started to
run, thus stopping the clock until such time as the state clears the path to
filing by removing the impediment. But once again, AEDPA does not
delineate what constitutes a state or government-created impediment.49 To
make matters even more difficult, circuit case law grappling with the
doctrine is relatively sparse.
At minimum, courts appear to exempt the role of judiciary from “state
action,” instead requiring the actor be an arm of either the prosecutor or
penalogical institution charged with the petitioner’s detention.50 Thus, a
change in state law that provides a new basis for relief will not qualify as an
impediment because, notwithstanding the prior adverse precedent, the
petitioner was still free to raise such claim in a federal petition “at any
time.”51 In other words, a pro se petitioner is expected to anticipate future
changes in the law that will inure to his favor, and seek habeas relief on a

47
See, e.g., Roberts v. Cockrell, 319 F.3d 690, 693-95 (5th Cir. 2003); Wixom v. Washington, 264 F.2d 894,
898 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1143 (2002); Gendron v. United States, 154 F.3d 672, 674-75 nn. 1-2
(7th Cir. 1998) (per curiam), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1113 (1999); see also I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz,
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b][i] at 272-273 & n. 49 (6th ed. 2011).
48
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(B); 2255(f)(2). See also Bryant v. Shriro, 499 F.3d 1056, 1060 (9th Cir. 2007)
(“To obtain relief under § 2244(d)(1)(B), the petitioner must show a causal connection between the unlawful
impediment and his failure to file a timely habeas petition.”); see also Broom v. Strickland, 579 F.3d 553, 556-57
(6th Cir. 2009) (rejecting relief based on impediment for lack of causation).
49
See Wood v. Spencer, 487 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting that the word “impediment” “is not defined in
the statute itself, nor is it self-elucidating”).
50
Compare Minter v. Beck, 230 F.3d 663, 665-66 (4th Cir. 2000) (negative caselaw rendering futile raising
of claim in state court did not constitute state-created “impediment” under § 2244(d)(1)(B), with Critchley v.
Thaler, 586 F.3d 318, 321 (5th Cir. 2009) (failure of county clerk’s office to timely file petitioners for postconviction relief constitutes “impediment” under § 2244(d)(1)(B).
51
See Shannon v. Newland, 410 F.3d 1083, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2005); Minter, 230 F.3d at 665-66.
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ground for which no legal support exists.52
To date, some circuits have recognized as a possible impediment the
state’s failure to make available to inmates legal material pertaining to
AEDPA, i.e., a copy of the statute itself, where the absence of that material
prevented the petitioner from learning of the one-year statute of
limitations.53 On the other hand, even in a capital case, errors attributed to
postconviction counsel, as opposed to a state or government actor, do not
constitute “impediments” under § 2244(d)(1)(B).54 In addition, the First
Circuit has rejected an argument that the state’s withholding of exculpatory
evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland55 constitutes an impediment on
the ground that the petitioner could have obtained the same evidence
elsewhere prior to trial in the exercise of due diligence.56
In light of the underdeveloped state of the law on the definition of
“impediment,” the lack of assistance of counsel may have a profound effect.
That is, by exploring the many interstices of this procedural doctrine, a
skilled advocate may succeed in securing a broader definition from a
particular court. In contrast, for the pro se litigant, the doctrine will likely
lie fallow and useless in his efforts to obtain federal review of otherwise
untimely filed habeas claims.
3. Necessary Efforts At Identifying Other Statute Of Limitations Triggers
a. Newly Recognized Constitutional Right
AEDPA’s one-year period of time to file a federal petition is also
triggered anew under § 2244(d) when the Supreme Court recognizes a new
constitutional right that is made expressly retroactive to cases on collateral
review.57 It is an open question whether the Supreme Court itself must
determine retroactivity, or whether lower federal courts are also authorized
under AEDPA to do so.58 Every circuit to consider the issue has concluded
that lower federal courts, as well as the Supreme Court, can make the
retroactivity assessment.59 Again, the fact that lower courts, at least for
52

Unless the Supreme Court makes a change to the substantive law underlying a constitutional claim
retroactive, even if the prior state of the law were deemed an “impediment,” the inmate would be denied relief on
the merits. See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); § 2254(d).
53
See Whalem/Hunt v. Early, 233 F.3d 1146, 1147-1148 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc); see also Moore v.
Battaglia, 476 F.3d 504 (7th Cir. 2007) (remanding for development of factual record regarding claim that
inadequate prison law library constituted a state-created impediment). But cf., Finch v. Miller, 491 F.3d 424, (8th
Cir. 2007) (rejecting on causation ground argument that inadequate library facilities or legal assistance qualified
as impediment).
54
Cf. Johnson v. Fla. Dep’t. Corr., 513 F.3d 1328, 1331 (11th Cir. 2008) (basing conclusion on the lack of a
constitutional right to post-conviction counsel), with Finch v. Miller, 491 F.3d 424, (8th Cir. 2007) (basing same
conclusion on ground that counsel’s conduct does not constitute “state action” under § 2244(d)(1)(B)); Lawrence
v. Florida, 421 F.3d 1221, (11th Cir. 2005) (incompetent assistance of counsel in capital postconviction
proceedings “is not the type of State impediment envisioned in § 2244(d)(1)(B)”).
55
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
56
See Wood v. Spencer, 487 F.3d 1, 6-8 (1st Cir. 2007) (noting “petitioner had the power to blunt the effect
of any state-created impediment”).
57
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(C).
58
I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b][i] at 275 & n.
55 (6th ed. 2011).
59
Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 364 n.4 (2005) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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now, can determine whether a newly recognized right should apply
retroactively leaves ample room for effective advocacy on the part of the
petitioner. Thus, the unrepresented petitioner is at a distinct disadvantage in
convincing a court of relief from AEDPA’s timeliness bar based on a newly
recognized constitutional right.
b. Discovery of Factual Predicate
The statute of limitations is also triggered under §§ 2244(d), regardless
of the above events, on the date on which the petitioner could have
discovered the factual predicate for the claim or claims raised in the petition
in the exercise of due diligence.60 The language of § 2244(d)(1)(D) is
ambiguous as to whether the statute of limitations applies to the petition or
to independent claims.61 Federal courts appear to endorse the former
interpretation, though will permit amendment of a pending petition to add a
claim derived from newly discovered facts that the inmate was unable
through due diligence to uncover at the time of filing.62 But the petitioner
must make the case for why he failed to discover the claim or claims earlier.
Without more, his pro se status, which encompasses the fact that he is
incarcerated without outside legal and investigative assistance to uncover
facts that might support a claim for habeas relief, will not suffice.63 Once
again, courts engage in mythical thinking in assuming that the average
incarcerated inmate is as able to litigate and conduct factual investigations
as the professional attorney.
4. Unpacking the Doctrine of Statutory Tolling
Calculating the start date for the statute of limitations is only the
beginning of the pro se inmate’s daunting procedural challenge of ensuring
his federal petition is timely filed. The second major hurdle in determining
the actual filing deadline is accurately calculating the effects of AEDPA’s
doctrine of statutory tolling. As a nod to the principles of federalism that
permeate federal habeas corpus and the accompanying requirement that
inmates exhaust all federal claims in state court,64 AEDPA provides that,
regardless of the date on which the statute of limitations starts to run, for
inmates challenging state convictions under § 2254, the clock will stop –
i.e., AEDPA’s one-year filing period is tolled – while “a properly filed
60

28 U.S.C. §§ 2244(d)(1)(D).
I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b][i] at 280-81
& n. 64 (6th ed. 2011).
62
Id. at 260-61 & n. 52-55 (internal citations omitted).
63
Rich v. Dep’t of Corr. State of Fla., 317 F. App’x 881 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding that pro se status is not an
extraordinary circumstance that entitled petitioner to tolling of the one-year time limit); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448
F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 2006) (pro se petitioner’s inability to calculate the limitations period correctly is not an
extraordinary circumstance and did not allow amendment to relate back to the date the original petition was filed);
United States v. Hale, 2010 WL 2105141 (S.D. Ala. 2010) (holding that pro se status was not extraordinary
circumstance to allow petition to be amended after the filing deadline had passed).
64
See exhaustion discussion, infra.
61
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application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect
to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending.”65 But again, the statutory
language of § 2244(d)(2) raises at least as many questions as it answers.
For example, what does “properly filed” mean? Does “or other collateral
review” include federal habeas petitions? How should federal courts
interpret “with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim”? What does it
mean to be “pending”? The federal judiciary has devoted substantial energy
since AEDPA’s enactment to each of these issues. As a result, some rules
are now clear through case law; others remain uncertain. The pro se inmate
must discern these nuances and distinctions, with consequences potentially
fatal to habeas review.
a. The meaning of “properly filed”
For purposes of § 2244(d)(2), “an application is ‘properly filed’ when
its delivery and acceptance are in compliance with the applicable laws and
rules governing filings,” such as, “for example, the form of the document,
the time limits upon its delivery, the court and office in which it must be
lodged, and the requisite filing fee.”66 Thus, the Supreme Court has
concluded, at least insofar as state law on timeliness is firmly established
and consistently applied,67 an untimely state petition is not “properly
filed.”68 Mundane as these assessments may be, the unrepresented habeas
petitioner again confronts the task of identifying, understanding, and
complying with state law governing collateral review in order to qualify for
AEDPA’s statutory tolling. Absent assistance from a competent jailhouse
lawyer or law librarian, the process can stall here, with the inmate unable to
figure out how to “properly file” a state petition, a step that in turn is
essential to exhaust claims a petitioner seeks to raise in a federal petition.
b. Figuring out what qualifies for statutory tolling: The scope of “or other
collateral review”
In 2001, the Supreme Court held that “application for State postconviction or other collateral review” does not contemplate federal habeas
petitions.69 Rather, the Court held, the phrase refers only to state
applications, and includes all state procedures available for review of a
65

28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2).
Artuz v. Bennett, 531 U.S. 4, 8 (2000).
See I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure § 5.2[b][ii] at
289-90 n. 68 (6th ed. 2011) (noting Pace’s holding “glossed over some complicating factors that were not at issue
in Pace and that may require additional analysis on the part of a reviewing federal habeas corpus court:” situations
in which (1) the statute of limitations at issue is not a jurisdictional time bar, as in Pace, but rather functions as an
affirmative defense subject to waiver; and (2) there was no clear “state law” on timeliness at the relevant stage of
the proceedings because the timing rule to which the state points – and upon which a state court ultimately relied
in deeming a state postconviction petition to have been untimely – had not yet been announced or was not firmly
established and consistently followed at the time the prisoner filed the state postconviction petition.”); see also
Walker v. Martin, -- S. Ct. -- (2011) (finding California’s timeliness bar independent and consistently applied).
68
Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 412 (2005).
69
Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).
66
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criminal conviction.70 Thus, no tolling applies -- i.e., the statute of
limitations continues to run -- during the time in which a federal habeas
petition is pending.71
While the Court’s interpretation of § 2244(d)(2) makes sense as an
intellectual matter, due to the length of time federal courts take to resolve
federal petitions, the lack of tolling for federal petitions has generated
enormous headaches for pro se inmates attempting to comply with the oneyear statute of limitations.72 Even where a pro se inmate manages to
negotiate the myriad landmines of AEDPA’s statute of limitations and
timely file his § 2254 petition, it is the rare case in which the one-year
period will not have expired by the time the federal courts have ruled on the
petition. Thus, a petition dismissed for procedural reasons may be forever
barred on the merits simply because the statute of limitations expired while
the petition was pending before the federal court.73 This reality hits pro se
litigants particularly hard for two reasons. First, it is axiomatic that such
petitioners are more likely to commit procedural missteps and hence,
confront this scenario than those represented by counsel. Second, where a
petition is at least partially unexhausted, i.e., the inmate has not yet
presented each claim raised therein to the highest available state court of
review, a district court will give the inmate the choice between dismissing
the entire petition “without prejudice” or staying the exhausted portion of
the petition and holding it in abeyance while the inmate returns to state
court to finish exhausting.74 The court is not required, however, to advise
the inmate that if he opts to dismiss the petition in its entirety, the “without
prejudice” language is illusory in that any subsequent petition in fact will be
time-barred.75 Hence, a pro se petitioner, well-intentioned but unschooled
in AEDPA’s intricacies is more likely to opt for dismissal. He will do so
with the misguided intention of refiling after exhausting the claims at issue
without realizing that the statute of limitations has expired and thus, any
future petition will be time-barred.76
c. Interpreting “with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim”
70

Id. at 176.
Duncan, 533 U.S. 167.
Nancy J. King, Fred L. Cheesman II & Brian J. Ostrom, Final Technical Report: Habeas Litigation in U.S.
District Courts (2007), available at http:// www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/219559.pdf at 42 (as of 2006,
federal habeas cases filed in 2002 and 2003 had been pending for an average of 5.3 years for capital cases); Judge
Arthur L. Alarcon, Remedies for California’s Death Row Deadlock, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 697, 699, 708 (in 1989,
the average delay for a federal habeas corpus case was eight years; as of 2006, a California inmate who filed a
habeas appeal and had his sentence vacated by a federal court waited an average of 16.75 years); Limin Zheng,
Actual Innocence as a Gateway Through the Statute-of-Limitations Bar on the Filing of Federal Habeas Corpus
Petitions, 90 CAL. L. REV. 2101 (2002) (the average time from date of conviction to the filing of a federal habeas
petition was a year and a half, by 1995 it had increased to five years).
73
The harshness of this consequence has spawned the “relation back” doctrine and, in some cases, has
provided a basis for equitable tolling. These doctrines will be addressed, supra.
74
Rhines v. Webber, 544 U.S. 269 (2005).
75
Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004) (federal district judges are not obligated to warn petitioner that
subsequently raised federal claims would be time-barred); Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005)
(court is not obligated to inform petitioner of what he must do to invoke stay and abey procedure or that federal
claims would be time-barred when he returns to federal court).
76
See id.
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72

17

Emily Garcia Uhrig

State attorneys have argued that § 2244(d)(2) should not apply if the
“State post-conviction or other collateral review” application did not raise
any federally cognizable claims or did not involve at least one claim later
raised in the § 2254 petition.77 Under this argument, if a petitioner files a
state petition only raising state claims or federally cognizable claims that he
later abandons before filing for federal habeas relief, no tolling under §
2244(d)(2) would apply. Given the likelihood that, untolled, AEDPA’s
statute of limitations would expire while such state application is pending,
such an interpretation would likely be a death warrant for any future federal
habeas review. To avoid this consequence, a petitioner would have to
anticipate and contemplate the contours of federal habeas review even
before filing for any state collateral review. Not only might this limit the
utility of the state collateral review process,78 but again, the pro se litigant,
less able to identify all potential claims, state and federal, from the
beginning and thus, more prone to piecemeal litigation, may find himself
time-barred from federal review.
Thus far, every circuit court to address this issue has rejected the state
attorneys’ argument for such a strict interpretation of “pertinent judgment or
claim.”79 Rather, the federal appeals courts have held that tolling applies
regardless of the particular claims raised in the state postconviction petition,
as long as the state and federal petition attack the same criminal judgment.80
But the Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue. Hence, the pro se
litigant remains vulnerable to a future Supreme Court ruling to the contrary.
d. Figuring out the meaning of “pending”
Lastly, federal courts have grappled with the meaning of “pending” as
used in § 2244(d)(2). What does it mean for a petition to be pending in
state court? Does this mean that in order to stop AEDPA’s clock, a state
petition must literally be pending before a state court? Or does the word
also contemplate the necessary time gaps between filings in lower and
appellate state courts? Again, AEDPA, itself is silent on the issue.
In 2002, in Carey v. Saffold, the Supreme Court concluded as a
threshold matter that “the statutory word ‘pending’ . . . cover[s] the time
between a lower state court’s decision and the filing of a [timely] notice of
appeal to a higher state court.”81 Thus, statutory tolling applies during the
intervals between a lower court’s denial of a state petition and the filing of a
77
See, e.g., Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912, 913-14 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Ford v. Moore, 296
F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520 (3d Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 1002 (2003); Carter v. Litscher, 275 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2001).
78
Arguably, a state petition for collateral review filed merely as a formality for exhaustion purposes will not
explore the parameters of relief under state law as fully as one focused primarily on the state process.
79
See, e.g., Cowherd v. Million, 380 F.3d 909, 912, 913-14 (6th Cir. 2004) (en banc); Ford v. Moore, 296
F.3d 1035, 1040 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam); Sweger v. Chesney, 294 F.3d 506, 520 (3d Cir. 2002), cert.
denied, 538 U.S. 1002 (2003); Carter v. Litscher, 275 F.3d 663, 665 (7th Cir. 2001).
80
See note 75.
81
Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 217 (2002).
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timely appeal. But Saffold was a California case, which complicated
matters in that the state uses a unique system of collateral review in which
each court – trial, appellate, and supreme – has original jurisdiction to
consider an inmate’s postconviction petition.82 Although in practice, most
petitioners ascend the courts as in other states, state law does not require
that they do so. And each petition an inmate files challenging a conviction
is considered “original,” rather than an appeal of a lower court’s denial.83
Thus, it was unclear whether a petitioner was entitled to tolling under §
2244(d)(2) for the intervals that elapse between a state court’s denial of one
petition and the filing of a subsequent one in a higher state court.84 The
Court in Saffold concluded, albeit somewhat opaquely, that interval tolling
does apply at least insofar as the petitioner timely files his subsequent
petition.85 But in so ruling, the Court acknowledged that “[t]he fact that
California’s timeliness standard is general rather than precise may make it
more difficult for federal courts to determine just when a review application
(i.e., a filing in a higher court) comes too late.”86 Indeed, the Court
remanded the case, in part, for the Ninth Circuit to consider whether a four
and a half-month gap between petitions filed in the California Court of
Appeal and California Supreme Court rendered the latter untimely.87
Four years later, in Evans v. Chavis, the Supreme Court again attempted
to clarify the tolling doctrine as applied in California.88 In Evans,
approximately three years had elapsed between the Court of Appeal’s denial
of a petition and the petitioner’s filing in the California Supreme Court.89
The state supreme court denied the latter petition without comment in a
summary order.90 In concluding that the collateral review application was
“pending” during the three-year period and thus, that the petitioner was
entitled to tolling under § 2244(d)(2), the Ninth Circuit treated the denial
“without comment or citation” as a “decision on the merits,” rather than a
dismissal as untimely.91
On review, the Supreme Court summarized its decision in Saffold as
holding: “(1) only a timely appeal tolls AEDPA’s 1-year limitations period
for the time between the lower court’s adverse ruling and the filing of a
notice of appeal in the higher court; (2) in California, “unreasonable” delays
are not timely; and (3) (most pertinently) a California Supreme Court order
denying a petition “on the merits” does not “automatically” indicate that the
82
See Carey v. Saffold, 536 U.S. 214, 221-223 (2002) (describing California’s collateral review system);
Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1036 (9th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging difficulty in applying tolling provisions to
the California habeas process because each of the three levels of state courts has original jurisdiction in habeas
proceedings); Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting that a habeas petitioner is entitled to “one
full round of collateral review” in the state courts before the federal statute of limitations begins to run).
83
Each state court determines the timeliness of a petition based on an indeterminate, “reasonableness”
standard, rather than a notice of appeal. See Carey, 536 U.S. at 221.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 222-23.
86
Id. at 223.
87
Id. at 226-27.
88
546 U.S. 189 (2006).
89
Id. at 195-96.
90
Id. at 195.
91
Chavis v. LeMarque, 382 F.3d 921, 926 (9th Cir. 2004).
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petition was timely filed.”92 The Court observed that, for at least six months
of the time elapsed between petitions, petitioner had access to the prison law
library to work on his petition.93 Additionally, the Court “found no
authority suggesting, nor found any convincing reason to believe, that
California would consider an unjustified or unexplained six-month filing
delay ‘reasonable.’”94 The Court therefore concluded the petition was not
“pending” within the meaning of § 2244(d)(2) during the interval between
denial of the Court of Appeal’s petition and petitioner’s filing in the state
supreme court.95 Thus, the Court reversed and remanded the case to the
Ninth Circuit for further proceedings. In so doing, as in Saffold, the Court
did not define “reasonableness” with any precision, instead deferred to state
law and a petitioner’s particular circumstances to inform that
determination.96
For the California litigant, the legal contours of statutory tolling after
Saffold and Evans are far from clear. In both cases, the Supreme Court
demurred on telling the lower courts – and hence, habeas petitioners – what
exactly constitutes a reasonable interval between state petitions to qualify
for interval tolling under § 2244(d)(2). Thus, petitioners must make their
best guess at how much is too much time to take in preparing a subsequent
petition. Where that guess is wrong, such as in Saffold and Evans, the
petitioner will be time-barred from federal habeas review under AEDPA.
As with the other intricacies of procedural calculations under AEDPA, the
pro se litigant is particularly vulnerable to this consequence as a result of
simple miscalculation or simply requiring more time than deemed
“reasonable” to investigate, research, and present habeas claims from behind
bars. Indeed, it is profoundly unfair to expect accuracy in calculation from a
pro se inmate on a topic that neither the Supreme Court nor the Ninth
Circuit has succeeded at clarifying.
There exists an additional aspect of statutory tolling calculation that
may prove particularly challenging to a pro se litigant in California: Lower
federal courts have applied statutory tolling to any second or successive
state postconviction petition that is “properly filed” pursuant to state
procedural law.97 But tolling is unavailable for the intervals between
successive rounds of state habeas petitions.98
Again, California is the problem child, as federal courts have struggled
to identify the point at which one “round” of postconviction petitions ends
and the next begins.99 For example, because each court has original
jurisdiction, a California petitioner can file three consecutive petitions in
92

546 U.S. 189, 197 (2006).
Id. at 201.
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Id.
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Id.
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See, e.g., Drew v. Department of Corr., 297 F.3d 1278, 1284-85 (11th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 537 U.S.
1237 (2003); Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d 1153, 1155 (10th Cir. 1999); Lovasz v. Vaugn, 134 F.3d 146, 148-49 (3d
Cir. 1998).
98
Banjo v. Ayers, 614 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2010).
99
See, e.g., Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030, 1040-45 (9th Cir. 2005).
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superior court, two petitions in the court of appeal, and a third in the state
supreme court, and not necessarily in ascending order.100 Or a petitioner
can skip over the lower courts altogether and file directly in the state
supreme court.101 How then to define the parameters of “one round” of
habeas petitions? The Ninth Circuit has attempted to do so by assessing the
claims raised in each individual petition to determine similarity or
distinctiveness.102 But petitions involving overlapping claims – some
repeat, and some new – defy easy categorization.103 If a pro se litigant
wrongly assumes he is pursuing a continuous “round” of habeas petitions,
and calculates his one-year period under AEDPA accordingly, he may be
ineligible for continuous tolling under § 2244(d)(2) and hence, face
dismissal of his § 2254 petition as time-barred.
5. Mining the Indeterminate Doctrine of Equitable Tolling
Yet another source of perplexity in calculating the time to file a federal
petition under AEDPA is the doctrine of equitable tolling. This doctrine is
a creature of common law, rather than the statute itself, with federal courts
importing it from other statutory contexts. Founded on principles of equity
– that is, what is “fair” under particular circumstances – the doctrine is
necessarily flexible and resists ready categorization.104 Instead, courts
inquire whether extraordinary circumstances, apart from the inmate’s lack
of due diligence, prevented him from filing his petition on time.105 Courts
define “due diligence,” in turn, as “reasonable diligence,” rather than
“maximum feasible diligence.”106
Until very recently, a majority of the Supreme Court had not embraced
the doctrine in the context of AEDPA.107 In Holland v. Florida., however,
decided in June 2010, the Court agreed with every circuit to address the
issue that the doctrine is in fact a viable one under AEDPA.108 To qualify
for equitable tolling, a petitioner must identify an “extraordinary”
circumstance that prevented his filing and show that he exercised
reasonable diligence despite that circumstance. Both tasks require legal and
analytical skills on the part of the advocate.
Courts have endorsed equitable tolling where delay that prevents timely
100
See Cal. Const., Art. VI, § 10; Walker v. Martin, -- S. Ct. – (2011) (noting that where the superior court
denies a petition, the petitioner can obtain review of the claims raised therein only by filing a new petition in the
court of appeal, confined to claims raised in the initial petition).
101
Id.
102
Gaston v. Palmer, 417 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2005) (comparing claims in multiple applications and granting
tolling because some claims overlapped).
103
Welch v. Carey, 350 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a petitioner is not entitled to tolling when he
abandons all initial claims from a first application in a subsequent application); In re Clark, 5 Cal. 4th 750, 770
(1993) (“A successive petition presenting additional claims that could have been presented in an earlier attack on
the judgment is, of necessity, a delayed petition,” requiring a “persuasive reason for routinely permitting
consideration of the merits of such claims.”).
104
Holland v. Fla., 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2563 (2010).
105
Id. at 2553 (citing Pace v. DiGuglielmo, 544 U.S. 408, 418 (2005)).
106
Id. at 2565.
107
Id. at 2560.
108
Id.
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filing results from judicial action or omission;109 certain actions or
omissions of petitioner’s counsel;110 the prisoner’s mental incompetence;111
and failure to provide petitioner notice of AEDPA’s filing deadline, either
through adequate law library or legal assistance facilities or court
notification.112 But prior to Holland, lower courts generally assumed a lack
of postconviction counsel or postconviction counsel’s miscalculation of the
statute of limitations does not provide a basis for equitable tolling because
such circumstance is not “extraordinary” given the lack of a constitutional
right to postconviction counsel.113 Indeed, in Holland, the majority seems
to affirm this approach, acknowledging that “a garden variety claim of
excusable neglect, . . . such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer
to miss a filing deadline . . . does not warrant equitable tolling.”114 But at
the same time, the Court observes that sufficiently egregious attorney error
may qualify as an “extraordinary” circumstance justifying equitable
tolling.115 Thus, the Court remanded the case to the Eleventh Circuit for
further findings and possible proceedings on the issue.116
109
Pliler v. Ford, 124 S. Ct. 241, 2447 (2004) (remanding to Ninth Circuit on issue whether magistrate judge
“affirmatively misled” petitioner, resulting in subsequent filing of time-barred petition, thus warranting equitable
tolling); see, e.g., Keenan v. Bagley, 400 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2005) (remanding for evidentiary hearing on
whether Ohio Supreme Court’s order extending state statute of limitations justified equitable tolling of federal
statute of limitations); Knight v. Schofield, 292 F.3d 709, 709-10 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (petitioner entitled
to equitable tolling where state supreme court sent notice of decision to wrong person, thus denying petitioner
timely notice).
110
Fonesca v. Hall, 486 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (C.D. Cal. 2007) (petitioner entitled to equitable tolling because of
the “egregious misconduct” of habeas counsel); Spitsyn v. Moore, 345 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2003) (petitioner
entitled to equitable tolling because of counsel’s “sufficiently egregious” misconduct); Downs v. McNeil, 520
F.3d 1311 (11th Cir. 2008) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to decide whether petitioner was entitled to
equitable tolling because of egregious conduct by counsel).
111
Calderon v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 163 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that equitable
tolling was warranted because of petitioner’s mental incompetency); Laws v. Lamarque, 351 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.
2003) (remanding for determination of whether petitioner’s mental illness constitutes an “extraordinary
circumstance” which would justify equitable tolling).
112
Roy v. Lampert, 465 F.3d 964 (9th Cir. 2006) (remanding for evidentiary hearing to decide whether
petitioner was entitled to equitable tolling because of insufficient legal resources in prison law library); Phillips v.
Donnelly, 216 F.3d 508 (5th Cir. 2000) (finding equitable tolling warranted due to four-month delay in notifying
petitioner of denial of habeas petition); Espinoza-Matthews v. California, 432 F.3d 1021 (9th Cir. 2005) (equitable
tolling appropriate where petitioner was not allowed access to his legal files for eleven months); Litt v. Mueller,
304 F.3d 918 (9th Cir. 2002) (remanding to determine if equitable tolling was warranted because petitioner was
deprived of access to his legal files for eighty-two days).
113
Lovato v. Suthers, 42 F. App’x 400 (10th Cir. 2002) (equitable tolling not warranted even when petitioner
missed the filing deadline because a public defender advised him to wait until after a proportionality review);
Beery v. Ault, 312 F.3d 948 (8th Cir. 2002) (equitable tolling not warranted when counsel took six months to
inform petitioner that motion for appointment of postconviction counsel had been denied); Kreutzer v. Bowersox,
231 F.3d 460 (8th Cir. 2000) (counsel’s failure to understand the one-year statute of limitations under AEDPA did
not warrant equitable tolling); Howell v. Crosby, 415 F.3d 1250 (11th Cir. 2005) (equitable tolling was not
appropriate even though counsel filed a state petition for postconviction relief two months after the federal
deadline); Frye v. Hickman, 273 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. 2001) (equitable tolling not available for miscalculation by
counsel of the limitations period).
114
Holland v. Fla., 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2564 (internal quotations omitted).
115
Id. at 2564 (noting that counsel not only failed to file Holland’s petition on time and appeared unaware of
the deadline to do so -- factors which, alone, “suggest simple negligence” -- but also failed to file on time despite
Holland’s many letters emphasizing the importance of doing so; failed to research the proper filing date despite
Holland’s letters identifying the correct authority for determining that date; failed to inform Holland in a timely
manner that the Florida Supreme Court had denied his petition, thus restarting the AEDPA’s one-year clock,
despite Holland’s repeated requests for this information; and failed to communicate with Holland over a period of
years, despite Holland’s repeated attempts to do so).
116
Id. at 2565 (noting the Eleventh Circuit erroneously concluded equitable tolling was per se inapplicable
based on attorney error and the district court erroneously concluded that Holland had failed to exercise due
diligence).
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This decision opens the door to further litigation regarding the effect of
attorney error – or perhaps even the denial of counsel altogether in an
unusually complicated case – on the availability of equitable tolling in a
particular case. Again, these are arguments that a typical pro se inmate is ill
equipped to make on his own behalf, but that could ultimately make the
difference between dismissal of a petition as untimely and judicial review
on the merits.
Due – or reasonable – diligence, on the other hand, at least until
Holland, requires more than identifying an objective circumstance that
impeded a pro se litigant’s preparation of his federal petition. For example,
some courts have held that a potentially extraordinary circumstance – such
as a six-week prison lockdown that precludes law library access – that
arises at the start of the one-year limitations period does not justify tolling
because a diligent petitioner still has an opportunity to make up for the lost
time.117 By contrast, the same six-week lockdown that occurs one month
before the filing deadline may justify six weeks of equitable tolling.118
Thus, again, a pro se inmate seeking equitable tolling based on a
circumstance beyond his control must take care to demonstrate adequate
causation, which is an inherently legal showing and one he may be hardpressed to plead sufficiently without assistance of counsel. Again, the
consequence of failing to plead adequately will be dismissal of a petition as
untimely, regardless of the merits of the claims raised therein.
D.

The Delicate Interplay Between AEDPA’s Statute Of Limitations And
Other Procedural Doctrines

The complexity of calculating AEDPA’s statute of limitations multiplies
exponentially in light of other procedural requirements under the statute.
For the typical pro se inmate, the interplay between these procedural
doctrines can convert an otherwise herculean task to a literally impossible
one. The primary culprits are the exhaustion requirement, prohibition on
second or successive petitions, and, to a lesser extent, the procedural default
doctrine.
1. The Exhaustion Requirement
The exhaustion requirement, which is founded on principles of
federalism, requires state inmates to present each habeas claim to the
117
See, e.g., Hizbullahankhamon v. Walker, 255 F.3d 65, 67, 75-76 (2d Cir. 2001) (no equitable tolling for
22 days spent in solitary confinement, and without access to legal materials, at outset of one-year limitations
period); Pfeil v. Everett, 9 F. App’x 973 (10th Cir. 2001) (equitable tolling not warranted for lockdown because
petitioner had eight months after the lockdown ended to pursue his claims). But cf. Giraldes v. Ramirez-Palmer,
1998 WL 775085 (N.D. Cal. 1998) (a lockdown over eleven months into his one-year deadline did not warrant
equitable tolling because petitioner had time prior to the lockdown to work on his petition).
118
United States ex rel Strong v. Hulick, 530 F. Supp. 2d 1034 (N.D. Ill., Eastern Div. 2008) (equitable
tolling warranted because petitioner was incorrectly informed of deadline, was in lockdown for fifteen of the
twenty-three weeks immediately preceding his filing deadline, and was not given priority access to the law library
when lockdown ended).
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highest state court before filing in federal court. The doctrine predates
AEDPA and AEDPA did little to change it.119 But AEDPA’s statute of
limitations significantly complicates the potential consequences of the
exhaustion requirement. Some problems are simply a matter of statutory
mechanics. Under the pre-AEDPA decision in Rose v. Lundy,120 federal
courts were required to dismiss “without prejudice” a mixed petition, i.e.,
one that contains both exhausted and unexhausted claims. In theory, the
petitioner then is able to return to state court to finish exhausting the claims
and then, assuming the state court provides no relief, re-file the federal
petition.121 The dilemma, post-AEDPA is that, as discussed, the statute of
limitations is not tolled during the period of time in which a federal petition
is pending in federal court.122 Thus, by the time a district court decides to
dismiss a petition as mixed under Rose v. Lundy because some of the claims
are unexhausted, or as entirely unexhausted, the statute of limitations often
has run. As a result, the petitioner will be time-barred from re-filing the
federal petition after exhausting all of the claims. In Rhines v. Weber, the
Supreme Court noted:
The problem is not limited to petitioners who file close to the
AEDPA deadline. Even a petitioner who files early will have no
way of controlling when the district court will resolve the question of
exhaustion. Thus, whether a petitioner ever receives federal review
of his claims may turn on which district court happens to hear his
case.123
In attempt to address this dilemma, the Court in Rhines unanimously
embraced a stay-and-abeyance procedure.124 This procedure allows the
district court to stay a mixed petition and hold it in abeyance while the
petitioner returns to state court to finish exhausting.125 Once the petitioner
has finished exhausting his claims in state court, the district court will lift
the stay and consider the entire petition.126 But, while the district court
must give a petitioner the option to stay and hold in abeyance his petition
before dismissing it, the court is under no obligation to advise the petitioner
119
Post-AEDPA, if a federal habeas petition contains an unexhausted claim that the court would otherwise
be required to dismiss for failure to exhaust, the court may nonetheless deny the petition on the merits if it
determines the claim has no merit. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). The court’s authority to consider an unexhausted claim
is also subject to an express waiver by the state of the exhaustion requirement. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(3).
120
455 U.S. 509 (1982).
121
Id.; see Rhines v. Weber, 544 U.S. 269, 274 (2005) (noting Rose “imposed a requirement of ‘total
exhaustion’ and directed federal courts to effectuate that requirement by dismissing mixed petitions without
prejudice and allowing petitioners to return to state court to present the unexhausted claims to that court in the
first instance. . . . [P]etitioners who returned to state court to exhaust their previously unexhausted claims could
come back to federal court to present their perfected petitioners with relative ease. See Slack v. McDaniel, 529
U.S. 473, 486 (2000) (dismissal without prejudice under Lundy ‘contemplated that the prisoner could return to
federal court after the requisite exhaustion.’)”); I James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus
Practice And Procedure § 5.2[b][v] at 317-318, n. 97 (6th ed. 2011).
122
See Duncan v. Walker, 533 U.S. 167 (2001).
123
Rhines, 544 U.S. at 275.
124
Id. at 277-79.
125
Id.
126
Id.
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that a failure to accept its stay-and-abeyance offer will likely foreclose later
habeas review on timeliness grounds.127 Tellingly, the Supreme Court
concluded it unfair to impose the burden of making that difficult
determination on the district court.128 Thus, a petitioner may opt to dismiss
the petition in its entirety without realizing that, in so doing, he is forever
closing the courthouse doors on himself. The pro se petitioner, unschooled
in the complexities of the statute of limitations mechanics, is particularly
vulnerable to such poor decision-making.
Nor does the stay-and-abeyance procedure offer any relief to a petitioner
who has filed an entirely unexhausted, rather than mixed, petition.129 In that
case, the district court has no choice but to dismiss the petition in its
entirety, regardless of whether the petitioner will subsequently be timebarred from re-filing.130 Thus, the pro se petitioner unfamiliar with the
exhaustion requirement who acts diligently in filing a timely federal petition
will be barred from federal review because the statute of limitations will
have expired. AEDPA’s statutory tolling provision for state collateral
proceedings, discussed supra, will be useless to him because it is impossible
to toll an already-expired limitations period.
The statute of limitations complicates the exhaustion requirement for the
pro se litigant in yet another manner, one for which the Supreme Court has
not attempted to craft a remedy. As discussed, AEDPA’s statutory tolling
provision set forth under § 2244(d)(1) stops the one-year clock while the
petitioner is exhausting potential federal claims, i.e., while state
postconviction petitions are pending. But the statute of limitations is not
tolled until the petitioner actually files a state petition. The clock will
continue to run during the time in which the petitioner is researching and
preparing that petition. A problem arises in states that provide inmates with
more than one year to seek postconviction relief.131 Unless the inmate is
sophisticated enough to realize at the threshold of his incarceration both that
(1) the federal deadline is one-year from the date the conviction becomes
final; and (2) that time period will continue to run until the inmate files a
state post-conviction petition, despite acting diligently and timely filing
under state law, he will still unwittingly miss AEDPA’s deadline. Selfdescribed “jailhouse lawyer” Thomas O’Bryant, who authored a symposium
127
Pliler v. Ford, 542 U.S. 225 (2004) (federal district judges are not obligated to warn petitioner that federal
claims would be time-barred); Brambles v. Duncan, 412 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. 2005) (court is not obligated to
inform petitioner of what he must do to invoke stay-and-abey procedure or that federal claims would be timebarred when he returns to federal court).
128
See id.
129
Jiminez v. Rice, 267 F.3d 478, 481 (9th Cir. 2001) (affirming dismissal of petition on ground that it
contained only unexhausted claims); Rasberry v. Garcia, 448 F.3d 1150, 1154 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that district
judges have discretion to grant a stay-and-abeyance while unexhausted claims are exhausted, but declining to
extend Rhines to situations where the petition contains only unexhausted claims, even where there may be
unexhausted claims that could be added).
130
Id.
131
See, e.g., Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 (instructing that postconviction motions are first filed
in trial court, within two years of the date the conviction becomes final); New Jersey Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) (“no
petition shall be filed pursuant to this rule more than 5 years after the date of entry pursuant to Rule 3:21-5 of the
judgment of conviction that is being challenged”); Maryland Crim. Proc. Code Ann. § 7-103(b) (petitions must be
filed within ten years of the sentence imposition).
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piece for the Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Journal in 2006 that
powerfully describes the virtual impossibility of filing a timely federal
petition from within the Florida Department of Corrections and his own
experience missing the AEDPA deadline, writes:
[P]risoners begin preparing for state post-conviction remedies under
the mistaken belief that they may use the entire two-year period [allotted
under state law] before filing their post-conviction motion in the state
court without missing any important deadlines.
I have been asked many times by prisoners who are out of time for
seeking federal habeas review, “How can I have only one year to file a
federal habeas corpus when I can’t file it until after I finish my state
remedies, and I have two years to file state post-conviction motions?
Should my federal time not begin after I finish with my state postconviction remedies?” Such a situation does not seem logical, but it is
the situation.132
2. AEDPA’s Proscription on Second or Successive Petitions
A federal petition that attacks the same criminal judgment as had a prior
petition that the district court decided on the merits rather than procedural
grounds is considered “second or successive.”133 Before AEDPA’s
enactment, federal courts assessed second or successive petitions in two
ways. If the successive petition raised claims distinct from those presented
in the first petition and the state objected that the petition was an “abuse of
the writ,” the inmate had to show “cause” for not raising the claim in the
previous petition and that he would suffer “prejudice” or a “fundamental
miscarriage of justice” if the court declined to review the claim.134 If, on
the other hand, the petitioner sought to raise a claim brought in a previous
petition that the court had decided on the merits, the court would consider
the claim only where inmate demonstrated “cause and prejudice” and the
“ends of justice” so warranted.135 But federal courts applied the same
cause-and-prejudice exception that applied to new claims analysis.
AEDPA implemented significant changes to both the governing
procedures and substantive standards for second or successive petitions. In
so doing, the revised statute dramatically restricted a petitioner’s ability to
file such a petition. First, the statute entirely prohibits filing a successive
petition containing the same claims as presented in the initial petition.
Procedurally, a petitioner seeking to file a second or successive petition that
132
Thomas C. O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Write: Indigent Pro Se Litigation After the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Symposium: Pro Se Litigation Ten Years After AEDPA, 41 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 299, 333 (2006).
133
II James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure §28.3[b] at 15741575 (6th ed. 2011).
134
See McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467 (1991); II James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz, Federal Habeas
Corpus Practice and Procedure §28.2[a], [b] at 1572-1573 (6th ed. 2011).
135
See Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333, 339 (1992) (citation omitted); II James S. Liebman & Randy Hertz,
Federal Habeas Corpus Practice and Procedure §28.2[b] at 1567-1571 (6th ed. 2011).
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presents new claims beyond those raised in the first petition must first
obtain authorization from a three-judge circuit panel by showing that the
petition satisfies AEDPA’s substantive criteria.136 The court of appeals
must act on the application for authorization within thirty days and its
decision is not appealable, i.e., cannot be the basis for a petition for
rehearing or petition for certiorari.137
Substantively, AEDPA’s standards for issuance of an order authorizing
a second or successive petition are very high: The petitioner must show
either:
(A) . . . that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law,
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court,
that was previously unavailable; or
(B)(i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been
discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; and
(ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of
the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish clear and
convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable
factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying
offense [i.e., actual innocence].138
By significantly restricting the availability of successive petitions,
AEDPA puts substantial pressure on the petitioner to include all viable
claims in the initial petition to ensure federal judicial review. This task is a
daunting one in light of the one-year time period within which the petitioner
must file. Prior to AEDPA, a petitioner was able to file an initial petition
containing claims that he litigated on direct appeal – i.e., claims that
required only copying from one pleading to another – but then take the time
needed to investigate and develop new claims that required expansion of the
factual record. Post-AEDPA, such petitioner must make the tactical
decision whether to file the petition quickly, with hopes to amend it before
the court rules on it to add additional claims, or take the extra time required
to prepare the additional claims and hope still to comply with the statute of
limitations strictures. Again, expecting this level of legal sophistication
from the average pro se litigant is naïve at best.
3. Procedural Default
The doctrine of procedural default also predates AEDPA and was
unchanged by the statute: If a claim raised in a federal petition is
exhausted, but the state court denied it on an independent and adequate
136
137
138

28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A)-(C).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(D)-(E).
28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3).
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procedural grounds rather than its merits, the federal court will dismiss it as
procedurally defaulted, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual
innocence.139 If the petitioner did not properly exhaust the claim but is now
procedurally barred under state law from doing so, the claim is also
considered procedurally defaulted and will be dismissed with prejudice,
again, absent a showing of cause and prejudice or actual innocence.140 But
a federal court will not honor a state procedural rule unless it is considered
“independent and adequate.”141 To be “independent,” a state rule cannot be
interwoven with federal law.142 To be “adequate,” the rule must have been
firmly established and consistently applied at the time it was invoked by the
state court.143 “State rules that are too inconsistently or arbitrarily applied
to bar federal review ‘generally fall into two categories: (1) rules that have
been selectively applied to bar the claims of certain litigants . . . and (2)
rules that are so unsettled due to ambiguous or changing state authority that
applying them to bar a litigant’s claim is unfair.’”144
Assessment of whether a state procedural rule is independent and
adequate is often very involved and the governing principles far from
clear.145 Again, for the average pro se habeas petitioner, the challenge of
understanding this doctrine and effectively countering claims of default, all
within the one year allotted by the AEDPA, is an exceedingly difficult, if
not impossible one.
E. The Prototypical Inmate
The procedural complexity of AEDPA litigation, daunting for any
layperson, is all the more impenetrable for many pro se litigants in light of
the high rates of illiteracy and mental health problems that plague the U.S.
prison and jail populations. The Supreme Court, itself, has taken as
axiomatic the fact that the inmate population suffers from
disproportionately high rates of illiteracy and mental health problems.146
Empirical data bears out this assumption.
The U.S. Department of Education’s most recent study of inmate
literacy rates, based on data collected in 2003, measured three types of
literacy: prose, document, and quantitative literacy.147 “Prose literacy”
139

See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991); Wainright v. Sykes, 372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Bousley v. U.S., 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998) (“Where a defendant has procedurally defaulted a claim by
failing to raise it on direct review, the claim may be raised in habeas only if the defendant can first demonstrate
either ‘cause’ and actual ‘prejudice,’ or that he is ‘actually innocent.’”).
141
See Martin v. Walker, 131 S. Ct. 1120, 1127 (2011); Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74 (1980).
142
Martin, 131 S. Ct. at 1127; Ake, 470 U.S. at 75.
143
See Martin, 131 S. Ct. at 1127 ; Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411 (1991); Valerio v. Crawford, 306 F.3d 742
(9th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
144
Bennett v. Mueller, 322 F.3d 573, 583 (9th Cir. 2003), quoting Wood v. Hall, 130 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir.
1997)).
145
See, e.g., Martin v. Walker, 131 S. Ct. 1120 (concluding California’s timeliness bar was independent and
adequate as applied and thus, a basis for procedural default of claims litigant sought to raise in federal petition).
146
See, e.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 579 (1974); Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 496 (1969) (J.
Douglas, concurring).
140

147
See U.S. DEPT OF ED., LITERACY BEHIND BARS: RESULTS FROM THE 2003 NATIONAL ASSESSMENT OF
ADULT LITERACY PRISON SURVEY (2003), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007473.pdf.
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describes “”[t]he knowledge and skills needed to search, comprehend,
and use information from continuous texts[, which would] include
editorials, news stories, brochures, and instructional materials.”148
“Document literacy” reflects “[t]he knowledge and skills needed to
search, comprehend, and use information from noncontinuous texts [and
would] include job applications, payroll forms, transportation schedules,
maps, tables, and drug or food labels.”149 Lastly, “quantitative literacy”
encompasses “[t]he knowledge and skills needed to identify and perform
computations using numbers that are embedded in printed materials[,
such as] balancing a checkbook, computing a tip, completing an order
form, or determining the amount of interest on a loan from an
advertisement.150 There were four categories of literacy: below basic,
basic, intermediate, and proficient.151
The report did not explicitly evaluate the ability of an inmate to read
and comprehend complex legal documents, statutes, or caselaw, let
alone to understand the intricacies of federal habeas filing requirements.
But based on the above definitions, such ability would implicate
primarily prose and, to a lesser extent, quantitative and document
literacy skills. Moreover, comprehending and effectively wielding
federal habeas corpus doctrine would require, at minimum, a proficient
level of literacy. The results from the study suggest very few individuals
behind bars would possess this capacity in that only 2% showed
proficient levels of document and quantitative literacy and 3% tested
proficient in prose literacy.152 For the remainder of inmates, even
assuming sufficient access to an up-to-date prison law library,153 legal
materials pertaining to habeas corpus practice lie far beyond the
reasonable comprehension of those who need to understand it most:
inmates who are required to function as their own legal counsel in
148

Id. at iv.
Id.
150
Id.
151
“Below Basic” reflects “an adult [who] has no more than the most simple and concrete literacy skills.”
“Basic” means “that an adult has the skills necessary to perform simple and everyday literacy activities.”
“Intermediate” indicates that an adult is able “to perform moderately challenging literacy activities.” “Proficient”
signifies “that an adult has the skills necessary to perform more complex and challenging literacy activities. The
separate category, “nonliterate in English,” applies to individuals unable to complete a minimum number of basic
literacy questions or unable to communicate in English or Spanish. Id.
152
Id. at 13, Figure 2-2. Forty-one percent had intermediate prose literacy, with fifty-six percent at
basic or below basic. Forty-eight percent tested at intermediate document literacy, with fifty percent
showing basic or below basic. And only twenty percent revealed intermediate quantitative literacy, while
seventy-eight percent tested at basic or below basic. The study also excludes altogether persons unable to
communicate in English or Spanish and those with cognitive or mental disabilities that prevented literacy
testing. Thus, the results may overstate the overall inmate literacy rates.
153
See Comment, Technological Leaps and Bounds: Pro Se Prisoner Litigation in the Internet Age, 10 U.
PENN. J. OF CONST. L. 819, 830-831 (2008) (arguing that constitutional right of access to courts requires internet
access for legal research, in so doing citing states’ dramatic cuts to prison law libraries post-Lewis v. Casey and
lack of internet access in all such libraries); Thomas C. O’Bryant, The Great Unobtainable Write: Indigent Pro
Se Litigation After the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Symposium: Pro Se Litigation Ten
Years After AEDPA, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 319-332 (2006) (describing severely limited legal resources
available to pro se inmates in Florida, including prison library law clerks generally equipped only with a high
school diplomas, a GED, or functional literacy and 30 hours of legal training; jailhouse lawyers who are
prohibited from, and punished for, possessing other inmates’ legal papers; the virtual absence of computers for
inmate research; and actual library access limited to once a week).
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pursuit of the writ.
Statistics regarding the relative mental health of the inmate population
in the United States are similarly bleak. A study released by the U.S.
Department of Justice in 2006 indicated that more than half of all
individuals incarcerated in this country suffer from mental illness.154 More
specifically, more than two-fifths (43%) of state prisoners and more than
half (54%) of jail inmates reported symptoms of mania.155 Approximately
23% of state inmates and 30% of those in jail reported symptoms of major
depression.156 Insomnia or hypersomnia and persistent anger were the most
commonly reported episodes amongst those reporting major depression or
mania, with nearly half of jail inmates reporting such symptoms.157 About
15% of state inmates and 24% of jail inmates reported symptoms of a
psychotic disorder.158 About 74% of state inmates and 76% of those in jail
with a mental health condition also met criteria for substance dependence or
abuse.159 Thus, even in the rare event that an inmate is sufficiently
equipped educationally to read and understand habeas doctrine, his ability
to do so may be profoundly impaired by mental illness.
F.

The Impact Of AEDPA On The Number Of Federal Habeas Petitions
Being Dismissed On Procedural Grounds And Thus, Failing To Reach
Merits Review

Empirical study confirms that, since AEDPA’s enactment, for noncapital litigants the Great Writ has lost much of its muscle.160 A 2007 study
conducted at Vanderbilt School of Law revealed that federal habeas
petitioners lacked assistance of counsel in 92.3% of non-capital cases.161
Moreover, under AEDPA, district courts have dismissed as untimely 22%
of non-capital federal habeas petitions.162 Of the time-barred petitioners,
only 5.1% had counsel.163 By contrast, only 4% of capital cases, where
154
See DORIS J. JAMES AND LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
MENTAL
HEALTH
PROBLEMS
OF
PRISON
AND
JAIL
INMATES
(2006),
available
at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf. Mental health problems were defined by either a recent history
or symptoms of mental illness within the 12 months prior to the study, which was conducted in mid-2005. But
inmates in mental hospitals or who were otherwise physically or mentally unable to complete the study surveys
were excluded. Thus, again, the above statistics likely under-represent the actual levels of mental illness in prisons
and jails. Id. at 2.
155
Id. at 3.
156
Id.
157
Id. at 6.
158
Id. A psychotic disorder is shown by signs of delusions or hallucinations during the prior year. Id.
Delusions are indicated by the inmates’ belief that other people were controlling their brain or thoughts, could
read their mind, or were spying on them. Id. Hallucinations included reports of seeing things or hearing voices
that others did not. Id.
159
Id.
160
See NANCY J. KING, FRED L. CHEESMAN II, AND BRIAN J. OSTROM, FINAL TECHNICAL REPORT: HABEAS
LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STATE
PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996, hereinafter HABEAS
LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, at 3.
161
Id. at 23.
162
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, at 6; HABEAS LITIGATION
TECHNICAL REPORT, at 46, 57.
163
HABEAS LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, at 46.
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habeas petitioners have a statutory right to assistance of counsel and thus
are not required to navigate AEDPA’s procedural requirements alone, were
dismissed as time-barred.164 The rates of non-capital petition dismissal as
successive (7%) or individual claim dismissal as procedurally defaulted
(13%) approximate pre-AEDPA practice.165 But as with the time-barred
cases, the dismissal rate on successive and default grounds in non-capital
cases, where petitioners are largely uncounseled, is much higher than in
capital cases.166 Finally, with respect to the effect of assistance of counsel,
the report found that the presence of counsel added 11%-49% more time to
habeas proceedings than in cases where the petitioner lacked counsel.167
The presence of counsel reduces the likelihood of early termination of
habeas cases,168 which typically arises with procedural dismissals.
This data illustrates the devastating effect that the statute of limitations,
combined with other procedural doctrines, has had on the pro se litigant’s
ability to obtain federal court review of the merits of claims raised in habeas
proceedings.169 More than one in five litigants are unable to file within
AEDPA’s designated one year time period.170 It is unclear what portion of
these cases involve litigants who simply miss the deadline due to failure of
calculation or those who are literally unable to file within the year allotted
to them while also satisfying AEDPA’s exhaustion requirement.
Regardless, a substantial portion of habeas petitions never clear the
courthouse doors for substantive review of the claims raised within them.
As a result of AEDPA’s dramatic effect on the efficacy of the Great
164
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, at 6; HABEAS LITIGATION
TECHNICAL REPORT, at 46, 57, 62 (noting “[t]he greater frequency of time-barred cases for non-capital prisoners
is expected given that unlike death row inmates in most states, non-capital habeas filers navigate the postconviction process and its deadlines without counsel”); 28 U.S.C.A. § 2261.
165
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, at 6; HABEAS LITIGATION
TECHNICAL REPORT, at 58. Because the study focused only on district court rulings, its authors acknowledge that
the calculated rate of petition dismissal as successive may understate the actual dismissal rate in light of the
gatekeeping role the court of appeals now play under AEDPA in authorizing the filing of successive petitions. Id.
The report indicates that the cases involving at least one procedurally defaulted claims are also underreported
because in some cases where the court had alternative bases for denying the petition, it would rule on the merits
first, and statute of limitations second, and thus never address the procedural default issue. Id.
166
The study indicates all claims were dismissed as unexhausted in over ten percent of non-capital cases, as
compared to less than 4% of capital cases. HABEAS LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, at 62. Stays for exhaustion
occurred seven times as often in capital cases than in non-capital cases. Id. Procedural default, however, was
invoked as the basis for dismissing a claim four times as often in capital as in non-capital cases. Id. Interestingly,
post-AEDPA, fewer courts are dismissing petitions on exhaustion grounds. Id. at 57 (reporting that, prior to
AEDPA, more than half of all claims raised in non-capital cases were dismissed without prejudice due to the
petitioner’s failure to exhaust in state court; post-AEDPA, 11% of non-capital cases involve dismissal of claims as
unexhausted). This decrease may be attributable to an increasing awareness of the need to exhaust claims – a
relatively straightforward requirement that does not involve the complex calculations of AEDPA’s statute of
limitations – and, to a lesser extent, district courts’ post-AEDPA ability to stay and hold in abeyance the
exhausted claims in a mixed petition, while the petitioner returns to state court to exhaust the remaining claims.
See id. at 57-58 (reporting that district courts stayed cases to allow a petitioner to exhaust unexhausted claims in
only 2.5% of non-capital cases and that these stays occurred in less than one-quarter of the districts).
167
HABEAS LITIGATION TECHNICAL REPORT, at 73.
168
Id.
169
See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791 (2009) (citing Vanderbilt study as evidence that federal habeas review of state criminal
judgments no longer works and thus advocating for abolition of federal review and reallocation of resources to
improve efficacy of trial court representation).
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY: HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS, at 6; HABEAS LITIGATION
TECHNICAL REPORT, at 46, 57.
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Writ for inmates seeking federal postconviction review of their criminal
judgments, some scholars have called for the abolition of federal habeas
corpus proceedings altogether, arguing that judicial resources are better
spent at the front end, providing defendants with competent trial and
appellate counsel.171 But the dire state of implementation of Gideon’s
mandate amplifies the critical need for providing counsel in habeas corpus
proceedings. With trial and appellate counsel stretched so thin, errors by
even the most able and diligent of counsel are inevitable. And the remedy
provided in habeas may be the only chance the indigent inmate has at
achieving the constitutional mandate of effective assistance of counsel,
albeit later in the process than contemplated by the Sixth Amendment.
Moreover, even if the judiciary had the resources and motivation to amply
animate Gideon, it is axiomatic that humans err. There will always be cases
in which a lawyer’s personal circumstances – physical or emotional issues
or even a temporary overextension within his/her caseload -- will prevent
him or her from providing competent representation. Affected clients are
entitled to a meaningful remedy. Recognition of a right to counsel based on
access to the courts would provide that remedy.
II. ACCESS-TO-THE-COURTS DOCTRINE
As discussed in the Introduction and Part I, this article argues for
recognition of a limited right to counsel for habeas litigants to ensure their
constitutional right of access to the courts. Pre-AEDPA attempts at
convincing the Supreme Court to recognize a right to counsel of any
dimension in state postconviction proceedings were unsuccessful.172 But in
light of the inordinate complexity AEDPA introduced to federal habeas
practice and the negative impact it has had on pro se litigants, this article
urges a revisiting of that precedent to the extent federal courts rely on it
failing to embrace a right to counsel in federal habeas proceedings. To do
so first requires an overview of the contours of access-to-the-courts
doctrine.
Justice Harlan once described the access doctrine as fundamental to the
rule of law in that the rule of law assumes that (1) the law will be enforced;
and (2) individuals who suffer wrongs under the law will be able to have
access to the appropriate forum, primarily courts, for enforcement of the
law.173 The access cases, either explicitly or implicitly, incorporate these
two assumptions and address measures necessary to ensure that the indigent
be able to get into court to enforce their legal rights. The Supreme Court
171
See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Rethinking the Federal Role in State Criminal Justice, 84
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 791 (2009) (citing Vanderbilt study as evidence that federal habeas review of state criminal
judgments no longer works and thus advocating for abolition of federal review and reallocation of resources to
improve efficacy of trial court representation).
172
See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551; Murray v, Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1.
173
Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374-375 (1971) (holding due process of law prohibited state from
denying indigent access to court for divorce proceedings based on inability to pay court fees and costs). See also
Cruz v. Hauck, 475 F.2d 475, 476 (5th Cir. 1973) (describing the right to access the courts as “the fundamental
right”) (emphasis in original).
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has recognized an inmate’s constitutional right to gain access to the courts
to litigate post-conviction and civil rights proceedings.174
The right of access derives from both equal protection and due process
jurisprudence, though the Court has not clearly articulated the nature of this
origin.175 The right, itself emerged from both constitutional challenges to
procedural requirements that prevent inmates from pursuing post-conviction
litigation as well as right-to-counsel jurisprudence.176 Today, though still
fairly ill-defined, the access right requires more than mere passivity on the
states’ part. Rather, in certain circumstances the right requires states to take
affirmative measures to ensure meaningful access to the indigent.
“Meaningful access to the courts is the touchstone” of the right.177 The
right has evolved in several stages.
A. Early Access Cases
The Supreme Court first invoked the access-to-the-courts doctrine in
1941, in Ex Parte Hull,178 to prohibit state action that directly obstructs a
pro se inmate’s ability to file a postconviction petition. In Hull, the Court
held unconstitutional a state prison regulation that authorized prison
officials to intercept inmate habeas corpus petitions that were thought to be
improperly prepared.179 The Court concluded:
[T]he state and its officers may not abridge or impair petitioner’s
right to apply to a federal court for a writ of habeas corpus. Whether
a petition for writ of habeas corpus addressed to a federal court is
properly drawn and what allegations it must contain are questions for
that court alone to determine.180

174

See Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817 (1977); Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343 (1996).
See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 11, n. 6 (1989) (“The prisoner’s right of access has been described
as a consequence of the right to due process of law, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396 . . . (1974), and as an
aspect of equal protection, see Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 . . . (1987)). The Court invokes equal
protection principles in evaluating whether state laws or policies discriminate between the indigent and the
financially able, see, e.g., Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 709 (1961) (holding that “to interpose any financial
consideration between an indigent prisoner of the State and his exercise of a state right to sue for his liberty is to
deny that prisoner the equal protection of the laws”), and due process doctrine in assessing whether state action
functions to preclude an individual from seeking relief in a judicial forum, see, e.g. Procunier, 416 U.S. at 419
(declaring invalid “[r]egulations and practices that unjustifiably obstruct the availability of professional
representation” as violating the corollary to “[t]he constitutional guarantee of due process of law . . . that prisoners
be afforded access to the courts in order to challenge unlawful convictions and to seek redress for violations of
their constitutional rights.”). Often, challenged laws or policies necessarily implicate both doctrines. See, e.g.,
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956) (where states provide for statutory right to appeal a criminal conviction, the
Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit erecting any financial barriers
that might prevent the indigent from appealing, e.g., requiring indigent to purchase trial transcripts).
176
See, e.g., Boddie, 401 U.S. at 374-75; Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1963); Draper v.
Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494 (1963); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252,
253 (1959); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963); Griffin
v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956).
177
Bounds, 430 U.S. at 823 (internal quotation omitted).
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312 U.S. 546 (1941); see also Bounds, 430 U.S. at 821-22 (recognizing Hull as the advent of the accessto-the-courts doctrine).
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Hull, 312 U.S. 546.
180
Id. at 549.
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Almost 30 years later, the Supreme Court held that the access right
guarantees more than merely the literal right to file documents in court.181
In Johnson v. Avery, the petitioner challenged a state prison regulation that
barred inmates from assisting one another in preparation of habeas
petitions.182 The Court held that, unless the state or some other source
provides legal help to indigent prisoners, the court cannot indirectly obstruct
access by preventing jailhouse lawyers from preparing habeas petitions for
other indigent prisoners.183 The Court underscored that
[s]ince the basic purpose of the writ is to enable those unlawfully
incarcerated to obtain their freedom, it is fundamental that access of
prisoners to the courts for the purpose of presenting their complaints
may not be denied or obstructed.184
Without the assistance of a jailhouse lawyer, the pro se habeas
petitioner’s possibly valid constitutional claims would never reach a court
for consideration.185 The Court noted that the problem of access is
particularly acute for the “high percentage of persons who are totally or
functionally illiterate, whose educational attainments are slight, and whose
intelligence is limited.”186 In his concurring opinion, Justice Douglas
elaborated:
In a community where illiteracy and mental deficiency is notoriously
high, it is not enough to ask the prisoner to be his own lawyer.
Without the assistance of fellow prisoners, some meritorious claims
would never see the light of a courtroom. In cases where that
assistance succeeds, it speaks for itself. And even in cases where it
fails, it may provide a necessary medium of expression.187
Following Avery, the Court in Younger v. Gilmore upheld in a twoparagraph per curiam opinion the lower court’s judgment requiring
California officials to provide indigent inmates with access to a
reasonably adequate law library for preparation of legal actions.188
Several years later, the Court unanimously extended Avery to cover
assistance by fellow inmates in civil rights actions.189 The Court
rejected the state’s attempt to distinguish the relative importance of civil
rights actions from habeas petitions, noting that both “both actions serve
to protect basic constitutional rights.”190 The Court observed:
181

See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483 (1969).
Id. at 484.
183
Id. at 490.
184
Id. at 485-86.
185
Id. at 487.
186
Id.
187
Id. at 496 (J. Douglas, concurring).
188
404 U.S. 15 (1971).
189
Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 577-580 (1974).
190
Id. at 579-580.
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The right of access to the courts, upon which Avery was premised, is
founded in the Due Process Clause and assures that no person will be
denied the opportunity to present to the judiciary allegations
concerning violations of fundamental constitutional rights. . . . The
recognition by this Court that prisoners have certain constitutional
rights which can be protected by civil rights actions would be diluted
if inmates, often “totally or functionally illiterate,” were unable to
articulate their complaints to the courts.191
B. Right to Counsel Cases
As the jurisprudence regarding the access-to-the-courts right was
evolving, the Supreme Court also began to define the parameters of the
indigent criminal defendant’s right to assistance of counsel. The right to
counsel cases, though initially not analyzed in terms of access to the courts,
echoed the same concepts of fairness and access to justice as the access
cases. Indeed, recognizing the similarity in constitutional underpinnings,
the Supreme Court would eventually fold this jurisprudence into its accessto-the-courts case law. Prior to this doctrinal merger, the right to counsel
jurisprudence developed as follows.
1. Right to Counsel at Trial
In Powell v. Alabama, the Court held the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause and Sixth Amendment require assistance of counsel for
capital defendants.192 In so holding, Justice Sutherland observed that “[t]he
right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not
comprehend the right to be heard by counsel.”193 Rather, both the
“intelligent and educated layman” and the “ignorant and illiterate, or those
of feeble intellect” “require[] the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him.”194
Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst, the Court held that the Sixth
Amendment requires appointment of counsel at government expense for
every indigent defendant in federal court who faces loss of life or liberty,
unless the defendant waives that right.195 In so holding, the Court observed
that the Sixth Amendment’s right to counsel clause
embodies a realistic recognition of the obvious truth that the average
defendant does not have the professional legal skill to protect
himself when brought before a tribunal with power to take his life or
191

Wolff, 418 U.S. at 579.
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
193
Id. at 68.
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Id. at 68-69.
195
304 U.S. 458, 462-63 (1938).
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liberty, wherein the prosecution is presented by experienced and
learned counsel. That which is simple, orderly, and necessary to the
lawyer, to the untrained layman may appear intricate, complex, and
mysterious 196
Similarly, in extending Powell to noncapital defendants in Gideon v.
Wainright, the Court noted:
[I]n our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into
court who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a fair trial
unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us to be an
obvious truth.197
2. Right to Counsel on Appeal
The right to counsel on direct appeal does not find its origin in the Sixth
Amendment. In fact, the Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, unlike the
Sixth Amendment right to trial, a criminal defendant does not have a
constitutional right to appeal his conviction.198 Instead, the right to direct
appellate review is entirely a creature of statute.199 Nonetheless, where
states decide to provide for a statutory right to appeal, the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit imposing
any financial barriers that might prevent the indigent from appealing.200
In Griffin v. Illinois, petitioners challenged a state law that required noncapital defendants to purchase their own trial transcripts.201 In finding the
law violated due process and equal protection guarantees, the Court noted
that, once a state decides to provide for a right to appeal, it cannot do so in a
way that discriminates against convicted defendants who happen to be
poor:202
There can be no equal justice where the kind of trial a man gets
depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute defendants must
be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who have
money enough to buy transcripts.203
After Griffin, the Court held other financial obstacles to direct appeal
to violate the Fourteenth Amendment. These barriers included a state
196

See, e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932);
Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963).
198
Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 160-61 (2000) (finding no constitutional right to represent
oneself on appeal); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (Black, J., plurality opinion); McKane v. Durston,
153 U.S. 684, 688 (1894); cf., McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429, 436 (1988) (“If a convicted defendant
elects to appeal, he retains the Sixth Amendment right to representation by competent counsel . . . .”).
199
Martinez, 528 U.S. at 160.
200
Griffin, 351 U.S. 12, 18-19 (1956) (Black, J., plurality opinion).
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Id. at 14. Illinois law required appellants who sought to raise non-constitutional errors to pay for their
own transcripts. Id. To the extent an appellant intended to allege constitutional errors, there was no charge. Id.
202
Id. at 18.
203
Id. at 18-19 (footnotes omitted).
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law permitting only public defenders to obtain free transcripts of a
hearing on a coram nobis application,204 which thus denied indigent
appellants transcripts for appeal unless counsel ordered them;205 a
requirement that an indigent defendant satisfy the trial judge that his
appeal has merit before obtaining free transcripts;206 and filing fees to
process a state habeas petition207 or to seek review from the state
supreme court.208
In 1963, the Supreme Court extended the reasoning of Griffin and its
progeny209 to hold that where a state provides for a right to appeal
criminal convictions, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses
require the state also to provide the indigent appellant with assistance of
counsel.210 At issue in Douglas was a California law that required
appellate courts to make a threshold assessment of the merits of an
appeal before deciding to appoint counsel to assist a defendant on direct
appeal.211 The Court held that when an indigent appellant must “run
th[e] gantlet of a preliminary showing of merit, the right to appeal does
not comport with fair procedure.”212 In such a case,
[t]here is lacking that equality demanded by the Fourteenth
Amendment where the rich man, who appeals as of right, enjoys the
benefit of counsel’s examination into the record, research of the law,
and marshalling of arguments on his behalf, while the indigent,
already burdened by a preliminary determination that his case is
without merit, is forced to shift for himself. The indigent, where the
record is unclear or the errors are hidden, has only the right to a
meaningless ritual, while the rich man has a meaningful appeal.213
In 1974, the Supreme Court in Ross v. Moffitt declined to extend
Douglas to discretionary appeals.214 In so holding, the Court emphasized
that an indigent appellant seeking the discretionary review of a supreme
court already has the benefit of attorney work-product from the first appeal,
which he need only duplicate with a request for high court review.215 Thus,
although undoubtedly helpful, assistance of counsel is not constitutionally
required.216 The Court noted:
204
A writ of coram nobis, as authorized by the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651 (2006), permits defendants to
seek correction of purely factual errors in their cases but does not allow review of substantive legal issues. See
United States v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67-68 (1914).
205
Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477, 480-81 (1963).
206
Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487, 494 (1963).
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Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708, 708 (1961).
208
Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252, 253 (1959).
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The Court decided Draper, Douglas, and Lane on the same day. See Draper, 372 U.S. at 487; Lane, 372
U.S. at 477; Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 353 (1963).
210
Douglas, 372 U.S. at 353.
211
Id. at 354-56 (majority opinion).
212
Id. at 357.
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215
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[The state’s constitutional duty] is not to duplicate the legal arsenal
that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant in a
continuing effort to reverse his conviction, but only to assure the
indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims
fairly in the context of the State’s appellate process.217
The Court underscored, however, that states must “assure the indigent
defendant an adequate opportunity to present his claims fairly.” Id.
At its core then, the right-to-counsel cases derive from a judicial
conviction that the courthouse doors will not close to judicial review of
claims raised by unrepresented inmates simply by virtue of the fact that
they lack the requisite legal skills to navigate the legal process. Thus,
where counsel is essential either to engage in trial advocacy or to frame
new claims on appeal, the right to counsel attaches.
C.

Bridging Access-to-the-Courts and Right to Counsel Doctrines:
Bounds v. Smith

In 1977, the Supreme Court formally merged the early access-to-thecourts cases with its right to counsel jurisprudence to articulate an access
doctrine of broader application. In Bounds v. Smith,218 state inmates filed
civil suit against the state arguing their constitutional right of access to the
courts required the state to provide adequate prison law library facilities or
other legal assistance in habeas litigation.219 The Court agreed, holding that
in some situations the access right places an affirmative obligation on states
to develop and implement “remedial measures to insure that inmate access
to the courts is adequate, effective, and meaningful.”220 In so concluding,
the Court invoked both early access-to-the-courts and right-to-counsel
precedent.221
The Court identified the core of its prior decisions striking down
financial obstacles to the appellate process – including lack of counsel – as
essential to ensure the indigent access to a meaningful appeal from their
convictions.222 Justice Marshall, writing for the six-Justice majority,
217
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appeals without payment of docket fees); Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961) (same, for habeas petitions);
Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 20 (state must supply trial records to indigent inmates seeking appellate review);
Eskridge v. Washington Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214 (1958) (trial transcript provision cannot be conditioned on court
approval); Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963) (same); Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963) (cannot
require public defender’s approval to obtain coram nobis transcript); Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966)
(unconstitutional to require only unsuccessfully imprisoned defendants to reimburse for cost of trial transcripts);
Long v. District Court of Iowa, 385 U.S. 192 (1966) (state required to provide transcript of post-conviction
proceeding); Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967) (state required to provide transcript of preliminary hearing);
Gardner v. California, 393 U.S. 367 (1969) (state required to provide transcript of habeas corpus transcript);
Mayer v. Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971) (state required to provide transcript of non-felony trial); Douglas v.
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rejected the state’s attempt to limit its reading of Johnson v. Avery223 and
Wolff v. McDonnell.224 Rather, the majority observed that at issue in those
cases was whether state policies prohibiting inmates from assisting one
another in preparing habeas and civil rights actions violated the access
rights of “ignorant and illiterate” inmates “without adequate
justification.”225 Because in both cases such inmates were unable to present
their written claims to the courts, their “constitutional right to help”
required at minimum permitting assistance from fellow, literate inmates.226
The Court noted that Johnson and Wolff “did not attempt to set forth the full
breadth of the right of access.”227 Indeed, neither case precluded requiring
“additional measures to assure meaningful access to inmates able to present
their own cases.”228
The Court further noted that it had long imposed affirmative obligations
on states to guarantee meaningful court access to all inmates.229 “[T]he cost
of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify its total denial. . . . [T]he
inquiry is . . . whether law libraries or other forms of legal assistance are
needed to give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to present
claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the courts.”230
Justice Marshall observed that “it would verge on incompetence” for an
attorney to file an initial pleading without researching relevant procedural
and substantive law.231 And if a lawyer must perform such tasks, so, too
must the pro se inmate.232 Indeed, it is likely even more important that the
pro se litigant “set forth a nonfrivolous claim meeting all procedural
prerequisites” to avoid early dismissal.233 Likewise, without an adequate
library or legal assistance, the pro se litigant is left defenseless to answer to
the respondent’s pleadings.234 The situation is particularly compelling in
habeas proceedings, where the petitioner often seeks to raise claims that
trial or appellate counsel did not litigate and thus, has no legal work product
off of which to work.235
But the Court emphasized that states have broad discretion in ensuring
constitutionally adequate access to the courts for inmates.236 Providing a
law library is but one means of doing so, and states are encouraged to
experiment with alternate approaches.237 The relevant inquiry is what steps
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223
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are necessary “to give prisoners a reasonably adequate opportunity to
present claimed violations of fundamental constitutional rights to the
courts.”238 Thus, the Court held: “[T]he fundamental constitutional right of
access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the
preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners
with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in
the law.”239
In so holding, the Court dismissed as “irrelevant” the state practice of
appointing counsel in postconviction proceedings where the petitioner’s
claims survive initial judicial review. Rather, the core concern underlying
the access right is “protecting the ability of an inmate to prepare a petition
or complaint,” that is, securing a foot in the courthouse door in the first
place.240
In dissent, then-Justice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger,
accused the majority of creating “the ‘fundamental constitutional right of
access to the courts’ . . . virtually out of whole cloth with little or no
reference to the Constitution from which it is supposed to be derived.”241
Justice Rehnquist warned that “[i]f ‘meaningful access’ to the courts is to
include law libraries, there is no convincing reason why it should not also
include lawyers appointed at the expense of the State.”242 “Just as a library
may assist some inmates in filing papers which contain more than the bare
factual allegations of injustice,” the dissent reasoned, “appointment of
counsel would assure that the legal arguments advanced are made with
some degree of sophistication.”243
D. The Right of Access, Post-Bounds
In 1987, the Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s claim in Pennsylvania
v. Finley that the “equal protection guarantee of ‘meaningful access’”
requires assistance of counsel during state postconviction proceedings.244
In Finley, the petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition in state trial court,
raising the issues her appointed counsel had raised on direct appeal to the
state supreme court.245 The trial court denied relief, but the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reversed, ordering that petitioner receive assistance of
counsel in her postconviction proceedings.246 After review of the record,
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petitioner’s attorney informed the court that there were no arguable bases
for relief and thus asked to be relieved as counsel.247 The trial court agreed
with counsel’s assessment and granted the motion to withdraw from
representation.248
With new appointed counsel, petitioner appealed the trial court’s
judgment.249 The state appeals court held that prior counsel had been
ineffective in moving to withdraw without briefing potential issues as
required by Anders v. California,250 and remanded for further
proceedings.251 The Supreme Court reversed, finding Anders inapplicable
because it derives from a constitutional right to counsel, which does not
exist in state postconviction proceedings.252 The Court observed that “the
right to counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”253
Moreover, “defendant’s access to the trial record and the appellate briefs
and opinions provided sufficient tools for the pro se litigant to gain
meaningful access to courts” for both discretionary appellate review and
postconviction proceedings.254
Two years after Finley, the Supreme Court issued a plurality opinion in
Murray v. Giarratano, holding that petitioners in capital cases do not have
an access-to-the-courts’ right to counsel in state postconviction
proceedings.255 In Giarratano, Virginia’s death row inmates filed a civil
rights suit arguing that assistance of counsel was required in order “to enjoy
their constitutional right to access to the courts in pursuit of state habeas
corpus relief,” as guaranteed by Bounds v. Smith.256 State prison facilities
in Virginia provided death row inmates with restricted use of law libraries
and appointed a number of staff attorneys to the various penal institutions to
assist inmates with incarceration-related litigation.257
The district court concluded that several special considerations
warranted greater assistance to inmates than outlined in Bounds.258
Specifically, in light of their pending execution, death row inmates have
limited time within which to prepare postconviction petitions, their cases
are exceptionally complex, and the psychological effect of their death
sentences impairs the ability to perform their own legal work.259 The
Fourth Circuit, en banc, affirmed the district court’s remedial order.260 In so
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holding, the appellate court concluded that Pennsylvania v. Finley was not
controlling because Finley was not a “meaningful access” case, did not
address the rule enunciated in Bounds v. Smith, and, “most significantly,”
was not a death penalty case.261
The Supreme Court reversed, affirming Finley, which, in disagreement
with the Fourth Circuit, it characterized as in fact involving meaningful
access to the courts:
The Court of Appeals . . . relied on what it perceived as a tension
between the rule in Finley and the implication of our decision in
Bounds v. Smith . . .; we find no such tension. Whether the right of
access at issue in Bounds is primarily one of due process or equal
protection, . . . in either case it rests on a constitutional theory
considered in Finley.262
Thus, the plurality observed that to interpret Bounds as requiring the
provision of assistance of counsel to capital inmates would require at least
partially overruling Finley based on the district court’s factual conclusions
regarding the unique nature of capital cases.263 Instead, the Court extended
Finley to capital inmates, in so doing noting that its “holding necessarily
imposes limits on Bounds.”264
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice O’Connor, writing separately,
concurred in the judgment.265 As a threshold matter, he noted:
It cannot be denied that collateral relief proceedings are a central
part of the review process for prisoners sentenced to death. As
Justice Stevens observes [in dissent], a substantial proportion of
these prisoners succeed in having their death sentences vacated in
habeas corpus proceedings. The complexity of our jurisprudence in
this area, moreover, makes it unlikely that capital defendants will be
able to file successful petitions for collateral relief without the
assistance of persons learned in the law.266
But Justice Kennedy also underscored that states have considerable
discretion in implementing measures that secure meaningful access to the
courts for its inmates, as required by Bounds.267 And significantly, despite
the lack of formal provision for appointment of counsel in capital cases, “no
prisoner on death row in Virginia has been unable to obtain counsel to
represent him in postconviction proceedings.”268 Additionally, Virginia’s
261
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penal institutions employ staff attorneys to assist inmates with
postconviction pleadings. Thus, Justice Kennedy concluded that he was
“not prepared to say that this scheme violates the Constitution.”269
Seven years after Giarratano, the Supreme Court modified Bounds in
Lewis v. Casey.270 In Casey, Arizona state inmates brought a civil rights
action under Bounds v. Smith challenging the adequacy of the state’s prison
law library and legal assistance program.271 The district court granted
injunctive relief on the ground that the prison system failed to comply with
the constitutional standards set forth under Bounds.272 The Ninth Circuit
affirmed the Bounds violation finding and, for the most part, the terms of
the injunction.273
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded due to the district court’s
“failure to identify anything more than isolated instances of actual
injury.”274 In so holding, the Court read into Bounds an actual-injury
requirement. The Court emphasized that Bounds did not “create an abstract,
freestanding, right to a law library or legal assistance” and thus, “an inmate
cannot establish relevant actual injury simply by establishing that his
prison’s law library or legal assistance program is subpar in some
theoretical sense.”275 Rather, the Court in Lewis held that, to show a
violation of the constitutional right to access to the courts, an inmate must
demonstrate that the prison’s alleged deficient library or legal assistance
resources “hindered his efforts to pursue a legal claim.”276
He might show, for example, that a complaint he prepared was
dismissed for failure to satisfy some technical requirement which,
because of deficiencies in the prison’s legal assistance facilities, he
could not have known. Or that he had suffered arguably actionable
harm that he wished to bring before the courts, but was so stymied by
inadequacies of the law library that he was unable even to file a
complaint.277
The Court also modified Bounds’s apparent expansion of the right of
access recognized in earlier cases, “which was a right to bring to court a
grievance that the inmate wished to present.”278 Specifically, the Court
disclaimed Bounds’s suggestion that “the State must enable the prisoner to
discover grievances, and to litigate effectively once in court.”279 The Court
concluded:
“To demand the conferral of such sophisticated legal
269
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capabilities upon a mostly uneducated and indeed largely illiterate prison
population is effectively to demand permanent provision of counsel, which
we do not believe the Constitution requires.”280 In short, Lewis made clear
that the access right is merely the right to get a foot in the courthouse door,
not a right to substantive assistance with one’s case.281 At the same time,
the right necessarily implicates a substantive component, which is inherent
in the right to have access to a law library or other legal assistance.
After Lewis, the precise parameters of the access-to-the-courts right as
applied to pro se habeas litigants remain imprecise. At a minimum, before
enactment of AEDPA and its concomitant procedural strictures, the
Supreme Court had declined to hold that the access right encompasses a
right to assistance of counsel.282 For death row inmates, however, Justice
Kennedy, with Justice O’Connor joining, premised his vote on the fact that
no Virginia death row inmate had in fact been denied assistance of
counsel.283 Hence, the issue is arguably still an open one.284 Instead, the
Court has adhered to a position that the access right is an inherently flexible
one, with states possessing broad discretion as to how to implement it. In
Lewis, the Court also underscored that the right encompasses only the
ability to get one’s foot in the courthouse door, rather than in discovering
and actually litigating claims in a petition.
But the dramatic change in federal habeas law brought by enactment of
AEDPA in 1996 changed the relevant legal landscape, and now calls for reexamination of the issue. Even for non-capital inmates, AEDPA’s complex
array of procedural requirements -- in particular, the statute’s one-year
statute of limitations and its interplay with other procedural doctrine -- have
placed the Great Writ out of reach for many pro se inmates. Absent repeal
of AEDPA, this new landscape, particularly as illuminated by the federal
courts since AEDPA’s enactment, necessitates recognition of a
constitutional right to assistance of counsel in deciphering the myriad filing
requirements and thus, gaining access to federal court review.
III. THE ACCESS TO THE COURTS DEMAND FOR COUNSEL IN POST-AEDPA
LITIGATION
As discussed, the constitutional right of access to the courts for habeas
petitioners is still fairly amorphous in dimension. In the absence of
assistance of counsel, the early cases, Johnson v. Avery285 and Younger v.
Gilmore,286 note the essential role of jailhouse lawyers and/or adequate law
280
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libraries in ensuring access to the courts for indigent habeas petitioners.
But after AEDPA, such alternate resources no longer suffice to protect the
indigent inmate’s right to access to the courts. Fellow inmates self-taught
in federal habeas corpus are generally no match for the rigor and intricacies
of AEDPA’s procedural demands. Nor will access to a prison law library
without legal assistance enable the average pro se inmate to gain adequate
insight into AEDPA’s myriad procedural requirements in order to fend for
himself.
Likewise, the right-to-counsel jurisprudence, as merged with the access
right, should not control. This caselaw contemplates the role of counsel in
researching and framing the substance of claims in discretionary appeals
and state habeas proceedings. The Supreme Court ultimately concluded
that where inmates are simply repeating claims previously litigated with
counsel’s assistance, the U.S. Constitution does not demand assistance of
counsel.287 But none of this jurisprudence considers the barrier to access
that AEDPA’s inordinate procedural complexity now poses to pro se
litigants.
In Bounds v. Smith, the Court identified substantive content to the
access right, finding its core to be “protecting the ability of an inmate to
prepare a petition or complaint.” 288 As discussed, with Lewis v. Casey, the
Supreme Court retreated from this interpretation, holding that “access”
signifies only the right to get one’s foot in the courthouse door, rather than
to possess full litigation capability once inside.289 The Court underscored
the need for states to have flexibility in implementing the right.
While such flexibility may have sufficed constitutionally to protect
Lewis’s more limited access right in the pre-AEDPA era, the dramatic
change to federal habeas practice that AEDPA wrought in 1996 demands
conferral of a right to counsel to federal habeas litigants. Indeed, the
Court’s decision in Lewis contemplates the reality of post-AEDPA habeas
practice when it posits as an access violation the case where the court
dismisses a pro se litigant’s petition due to failure to comply with a
technical requirement that the litigant could not have known about, or
where the inmate is unable to file for relief altogether as a result of
inadequate legal resources.290 In Lewis’s era, these hypotheticals bordered
on the extreme. But today, federal habeas practice epitomizes these
examples in that AEDPA’s procedural complexity is all but
incomprehensible to the average inmate, regardless of the library facilities
available to the inmate. The Vanderbilt study finding that 22% of noncapital petitions are dismissed on timeliness grounds alone, with another
7% dismissed as successive and 13% of individual claims procedurally
barred, bears this out. 291 A copy of the statute and federal case reporters,
287
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though perhaps sufficient in pre-AEDPA practice, will not begin to unpack
the intricacies of AEDPA’s myriad requirements for the average pro se
inmate. Indeed, federal courts have devoted substantial energy over the
past fifteen years to distilling the actual mechanics of AEDPA’s procedural
requirements, in particular, its statute of limitations. Notwithstanding the
skill and experience of the federal bench, this process remains a daunting
one.
Without a lawyer, in sufficient time, an inmate might be able to
articulate his core concerns – e.g., “my lawyer didn’t talk to my alibi
witness” or “the prosecutor didn’t give my lawyer all of the evidence,” –
and the judge, with a law clerk at hand, can typically figure out the
underlying constitutional issues presented.292 But once the procedural
barricade of AEDPA was erected, and pro se inmates were required to
navigate the intricacies of a short statute of limitations, together with the
exhaustion and procedural default doctrines and the new bar on successive
petitions, the courthouse doors in effect slammed shut. Most inmates, while
perhaps capable of inartfully informing the court why they think they
should not be behind bars, are not capable of navigating a very complicated
set of procedural rules. For these inmates, AEDPA erected an impenetrable
barrier to habeas review.
Nor does removal of restrictions on inmates helping one another suffice,
constitutionally.293 True, in time, some inmates might be able to educate
themselves to a point at which their knowledge rivals, if not surpasses,
professional counsel.294 But without systemic provision of competent legal
assistance or a remedy for the lack thereof, too many inmates will come up
short, with little correlation in case outcome to the actual merits of their
cases. Denial of counsel in modern federal habeas practice is akin to denial
of access to the jailhouse lawyer and/or an adequate prison law library in
the pre-AEDPA world.
Lewis seems to hold that a petitioner can show an access violation only
after the fact, and only where he was denied review of an arguably valid
claim.295 This would preclude relief for inmates who are unable to identify
potentially meritorious claims that they would have raised in a procedurally
barred habeas petition. It would also preclude any injunctive relief or
292
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provision of counsel before dismissal of a habeas petition. The Court has
not shed additional light on this aspect of its decision since Lewis. But such
holding stands in direct conflict with access-to-the-courts jurisprudence. As
discussed, Bounds merged the decisions that involved literal impediments to
indigent filing -- e.g., filing fees, prison official screening of petitions, and
unavailability of trial transcripts to pro se litigants – with the right-tocounsel jurisprudence, all of which define the right of access as entirely
independent of the merits of the petitioner’s case. Rather, the essence of the
right is merely the ability to present one’s case before the judiciary,
regardless of the ultimate outcome. Hence, to the extent Lewis requires
more, the decision should be overruled as at odds with decades of Supreme
Court jurisprudence.
Regardless, after Lewis, it is clear that the right of access at best means a
right to assistance of counsel in clearing AEDPA’s procedural hurdles to
federal habeas review. It does not contemplate assistance of counsel in
researching and framing those claims.296 Thus, a right to postconviction
counsel based on access doctrine would extend only to penetrating the
procedural thicket cultivated by AEDPA, and no farther.
There are a number of methods that could serve to fulfill this
constitutional mandate. Specifically, federal courts could (1) provide
counsel to assist indigent inmates in navigating AEDPA’s procedural
requirements and filing the petition within the provided one-year time
period as well as a remedy where attorney error causes dismissal of a
petition on procedural grounds; (2) where provision of counsel is
impractical, simply provide a remedy to petitioners where they fail to
satisfy AEDPA’S myriad procedural requirements for reasons other than
lack of due diligence; (3) recognize ineffective assistance of counsel or
denial of counsel altogether as a basis for statutory or equitable relief from
AEDPA’s strictures; or (4) enact policy reforms either to reduce the number
of inmates pursuing the writ of habeas corpus or to repeal AEDPA’s
procedural requirements altogether.
A. Providing Counsel
To implement an access right to counsel, the federal government can
invoke the ready structure of the federal public defenders’ offices and/or
federal panels for court-appointed counsel. Indeed, some federal public
defenders offices already staff attorneys competent in AEDPA’s intricacies
and pitfalls as a result of capital defense practice.297 As a matter of course,
inmates whose convictions are affirmed on direct appeal would receive
consultation with counsel regarding the postconviction process. If an
296
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inmate indicates interest in pursuing postconviction relief, counsel would
advise him of the procedural requirements under AEDPA. Counsel would
also advise state inmates regarding the role state postconviction proceedings
play in properly exhausting any claims presented in a federal petition and in
tolling AEDPA’s statute of limitations. In practice, implementation of the
right would mimic the constitutional right to counsel on direct appeal, albeit
counsel’s role would be a more limited one: to ensure that the inmate is not
denied habeas review based on failure to comprehend and navigate
AEDPA’s procedural requirements.
B.

Providing a Remedy for Ineffective Assistance of Postconviction
Counsel

1. The Constitutional Requirement of Effective Assistance of Counsel
It is well-established that the constitutional rights to counsel at trial and
on direct appeal guarantee rights to effective assistance of counsel.298
Where counsel renders ineffective assistance, a defendant may seek relief,
usually in postconviction proceedings, from the consequences of that
incompetence. In Strickland v. Washington, the Supreme Court set forth a
two-part test for establishing constitutionally ineffective assistance of trial
counsel: First, the defendant must show that defense counsel acted
unreasonably, that is, contrary to “prevailing professional norms.”299
Second, the defendant must show prejudice: that there is a “reasonable
probability” that the result of the proceeding would have been different if
defense counsel had performed competently.300 In Evitts v. Lucey, the
Court recognized that the constitutional right to counsel on direct appeal
likewise requires effective assistance of counsel, for which the Strickland
test informs the remedy.301
Similarly, recognition of a constitutional right to counsel in filing a first
federal habeas petition would require a remedy for procedural errors that are
attributable to attorney incompetence or lack of counsel altogether. Thus,
where the petitioner demonstrates that counsel’s assistance was
professionally unreasonable, or altogether denied, and that one or more of
AEDPA’s procedural hurdles precluded habeas review of his claims as a
result, he would be entitled to relief. Such relief could obtain by relieving
the inmate from the preclusive strictures of the procedural doctrine at issue.
Thus, for example, the district court would review the substantive claims in
an otherwise time-barred petition, a procedurally defaulted claim, and/or a
second or successive petition, containing claim(s) overlooked or excluded
298
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in the first petition due to attorney error or failure to provide assistance of
counsel altogether.302
2. Statutory and equitable relief from AEDPA’s strictures
a. Relief From The Statute Of Limitations
As discussed, AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations is responsible
for the majority of the federal habeas petitions that federal courts deny for
procedural reasons, rather than on the merits.303 Recognition of a right to
counsel based on access to the courts would mean that, where counsel fails
to advise an inmate accurately regarding the calculation of the one-year
period, two doctrines could supply an inmate with relief.
First, the government’s failure to provide effective assistance of counsel
would constitute an “impediment to filing” and thus, a basis for statutory
tolling, under § 2244(d)(1)(B). Indeed, some federal courts have already
recognized that a state’s failure to provide an inmate with a copy of the
federal habeas statute as revised under AEDPA constitutes an impediment
and therefore justifies statutory tolling of the statute of limitations for the
period during which the impediment existed.304 Thus, where competent
counsel is unavailable to assist an inmate in comprehending and navigating
the statute of limitations within the defined year, the statute of limitations
would be tolled until the inmate receives this assistance.
Second, a lack of competent post-conviction counsel could provide a
basis for equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. The plight of the pro
se inmate in filing within the statute of limitations has already found some
traction in equitable tolling doctrine. For example, federal courts have
applied equitable tolling where counsel fails to return petitioner’s file in
time to enable petitioner to timely file his federal petition305 or where the
prison library lacks even a copy of AEDPA.306 Most recently, the Supreme
Court held that extraordinary ineffective assistance of court-appointed postconviction counsel, which resulted in a time-barred federal petition in a
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capital case, may justify equitable tolling.307 But thus far, courts have
declined to apply equitable tolling based on “ordinary” ineffective
assistance of counsel.308 Recognition of an access-based right to counsel
would provide a basis for equitable tolling where a petitioner files his
petition outside the one-year period of time as a result of misapprehension
of the requirements of the statute of limitations, based in turn on denial of
counsel or incompetent assistance of counsel.309
Recognition of an access right to counsel would not offer relief from the
exhaustion requirement. But with statutory and equitable tolling available
based on post-conviction counsel’s error, a state petitioner who fails to
exhaust all federal claims due to incompetent counsel would remain able to
return to state court to finish exhausting his claims without being timebarred from re-filing under AEDPA.
b. Relief From Procedural Default Doctrine
Similarly, even absent a miscarriage of justice, recognition of an access
right to counsel would enable petitioners to pursue claims that are otherwise
procedurally defaulted to the extent the default is the result of faulty advice
by postconviction counsel and would suffer prejudice from the default.310
As discussed,311 under AEDPA, the procedural default doctrine permits
review of otherwise defaulted claims where a petitioner can demonstrate
cause and prejudice or actual innocence.312 The Supreme Court has not
clearly defined either “cause” or “prejudice.”313 Although the Court has not
articulated a comprehensive list of circumstances that qualify as “cause,”314
such event generally must be some “objective factor” external to the
defense.315 Nonetheless, the Court has recognized as sufficient cause
situations in which the state impeded or prevented compliance with the
procedural rule in question316 or where defense counsel error caused the
default at a stage where petitioner was constitutionally or statutorily entitled
to effective assistance of counsel.317 Similarly, “cause” to excuse a
procedural default arises where the state denied petitioner a constitutional or
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statutory right to counsel altogether, thus forcing him to proceed pro so.318
As such, assuming prejudice, recognition of an access-to-the courts right to
assistance of counsel in federal habeas proceedings would qualify as
“cause” to excuse procedural defaults caused by either attorney error or a
federal habeas petitioner’s pro se status.319
c. Policy-Based Reforms
As anyone who does death penalty work can attest, states have failed
miserably at providing adequate, effective assistance of counsel to criminal
defendants at trial and on direct appeal.320 The situation has only grown
worse with escalating rates of incarceration and nationwide state budget
crises. Thus, at least under the criminal justice system as currently
configured, providing attorneys in all federal post-conviction proceedings
may well be financially untenable. But as Justice Marshall observed in
Bounds v. Smith, “the cost of protecting a constitutional right cannot justify
its total denial.”321
At least several possibilities exist to enable
constitutional compliance without public financial ruin.
First, because inmates must still be “in custody” as well as have
completed the direct appellate process in order to file a federal habeas
petition, federal habeas petitioners are typically those serving long
sentences. Thus, a good starting point would be to re-evaluate the state
sentencing codes. Specifically, states could choose to incarcerate fewer
people and for shorter periods of time by revisiting the misguided policies
of the 1980s and 1990s that resulted in the large-scale incarceration of the
American people.322 This approach would free up resources throughout the
criminal justice system without compromising its integrity.
Second, states could simply decline to provide counsel to inmates as
required under an access doctrine but instead, provide the equitable or
statutory relief from AEDPA’s procedural strictures as articulated above.
Lastly, and perhaps most simply, Congress could repeal AEDPA.
Indeed, I suspect that if the Supreme Court were to recognize an accessbased constitutional right to counsel in light of AEDPA’s procedural
complexities, repeal of AEDPA’s statute of limitations would quickly
follow.
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CONCLUSION

In the trial context, the Supreme Court has recognized that “[w]hile a
criminal trial is not a game in which the participants are expected to enter
the ring with a near match in skills, neither is it a sacrifice of unarmed
prisoners to gladiators.”323 What has emerged in federal habeas practice for
noncapital, pro se litigants is precisely such a slaughter. In the absence of a
right to assistance of counsel, the myriad procedural requirements under
AEDPA render too many pro se litigants helpless in pursuit of the Great
Writ, effectively denying them their right of access to the courts. The effect
of denying assistance of counsel in ascertaining and complying with
AEDPA’s one-year statute of limitations and accompanying procedural
rules is no less potent an impediment to judicial review than the obstacles
struck down in the access cases. Thus, absent the fortuity of competent
jailhouse counsel, the average pro se inmate lacks an “adequate opportunity
to present his claims fairly” in federal habeas proceedings.324 Without
assistance of counsel in navigating through AEDPA’s procedural thicket,
the pro se petitioner must shoot into the dark at what has revealed itself to
be an elusive and moving target. When he misapprehends the strictures of
AEDPA, the courthouse doors slam shut, with no remedy available to
reopen them.
In short, the reality of post-AEDPA habeas practice demands
recognition of a right to counsel to ensure the indigent litigant’s access to
the courts. A right to counsel based on access-to-the-courts doctrine is an
inherently limited one in that, after Lewis v. Casey, the right of access
guarantees nothing more than gaining literal entrance through the
courthouse door.325 Hence, if recognized, such a right would require
competent legal assistance for indigent inmates in navigating and
comprehending AEDPA’s procedural requirements, but nothing more. This
right, combined with the equal protection and due process right outlined in
my first article, which would attach to all claims for which habeas corpus
functions as a first appeal of right, combine to provide the indigent litigant
with a meaningful opportunity to pursue the Great Writ.
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